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Articles 
Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss 
Curtis A. Bradley* 
The termination of U.S. treaties provides an especially rich example of 
how governmental practices can provide a “gloss” on the Constitution’s 
separation of powers.  The authority to terminate treaties is not addressed 
specifically in the constitutional text and instead has been worked out over time 
through political-branch practice.  This practice, moreover, has developed 
largely without judicial review.  Despite these features, Congress and the 
President—and the lawyers who advise them—have generally treated this issue 
as a matter of constitutional law rather than merely political happenstance.  
Importantly, the example of treaty termination illustrates not only how 
historical practice can inform constitutional understandings but also how these 
understandings can change.  Whereas it was generally understood throughout 
the nineteenth century that the termination of treaties required congressional 
involvement, the consensus on this issue disappeared in the early parts of the 
twentieth century, and today it is widely (although not uniformly) accepted that 
presidents have a unilateral power of treaty termination.  This shift in 
constitutional understandings did not occur overnight or in response to one 
particular episode but rather was the product of a long accretion of Executive 
Branch claims and practice in the face of congressional inaction.  An 
examination of the way in which historical practice has shaped the 
constitutional debates and understandings concerning this issue can help shed 
light on some of the interpretive and normative challenges associated with a 
practice-based approach to the separation of powers. 
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Introduction 
Historical practice is frequently invoked in debates and decisions 
concerning the Constitution’s distribution of authority between Congress 
and the President.  On issues ranging from the President’s authority to make 
recess appointments, to the role of Congress in authorizing military 
operations, to the validity of “executive agreements” with foreign nations, 
the way in which the government has operated over time is invoked as 
evidence of constitutional meaning.1  Such governmental practice is 
sometimes referred to as “historical gloss,” after Justice Frankfurter’s 
contention in the Youngstown2 steel-seizure case that “a systematic, 
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the 
Congress and never before questioned . . . may be treated as a gloss on 
‘executive Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.”3 
This Article presents a detailed case study of historical gloss, focused 
on presidential authority to terminate treaties.  Treaty termination is an 
especially rich example of how governmental practices can inform and even 
define the Constitution’s separation of powers.  The authority to terminate 
treaties is not addressed specifically in the constitutional text and instead 
has been worked out over time through political-branch practice.  This 
practice, moreover, has developed largely without judicial review.  Despite 
these features, Congress and the President—and the lawyers who advise 
them—have generally treated this issue as a matter of constitutional law, 
 
1. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the 
Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012) (considering the role of historical practice in 
debates and decisions relating to the separation of powers); Michael J. Glennon, The Use of 
Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 109 (1984) (same). 
2. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
3. Id. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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not merely political happenstance.  Legal scholars, too, have long discussed 
and debated the issue in legal terms.  At the same time, there has been a 
recognition that the constitutional law in this area is not entirely distinct 
from politics, and that it both is informed by and shapes political 
contestation. 
The example of treaty termination illustrates not only how a 
constitutional gloss on governmental authority can develop but also how it 
can change.  As will be seen, the center of gravity of the debate over treaty 
termination has shifted substantially over time, from whether the full 
Congress or merely the Senate needs to approve a termination to whether 
Congress or the Senate can even limit the President’s unilateral authority to 
terminate.  One can identify a pattern of change, the contours of which may 
apply to other issues of constitutional law relating to presidential authority: 
First there is a consensus, both among the governmental actors and in the 
scholarly community.  Then deviations take place with a potentially limited 
scope.  The Executive Branch proceeds to articulate broader theories of the 
deviations.  Congress’s resistance is intermittent, depending on whether it 
objects to the deviations on policy grounds.  Practice then builds up around 
low-stakes examples.  Eventually a more controversial example arises and 
the President pushes forward successfully, thereby consolidating the 
changed understanding.  
In developing the case study, this Article makes three contributions.  
First, it presents the most complete and accurate account to date of the 
historical practice of U.S. treaty terminations.  In addition to reviewing 
various publicly available materials, such as congressional hearings and 
presidential proclamations, this Article considers a number of internal legal 
memoranda obtained from the State Department archives.  Second, this 
Article recovers a nineteenth-century understanding of treaty-termination 
authority that has largely been lost from modern considerations of the issue, 
pursuant to which the termination of treaties, like the making of treaties, 
was generally understood by both Congress and the President as a shared 
power.  Most modern accounts acknowledge vaguely that treaty 
terminations have been accomplished in a variety of ways throughout U.S. 
history but fail to appreciate the sharp contrast between the modern 
presidential unilateralism and the nineteenth-century practices and 
understandings.  In endorsing a unilateral presidential power to terminate 
treaties, for example, the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of 
the Foreign Relations Law notes in passing that “[p]ractice has varied” 
without acknowledging that presidential unilateralism is almost entirely a 
twentieth-century development.4  Third, this Article uses this historical 
 
4. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 339 reporters’ note 2 (1987) (“Practice has varied, the President sometimes terminating an 
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record as a window into the nature of a practice-based approach to 
constitutional interpretation and some of its limitations and challenges. 
Part I of this Article provides the legal and theoretical background 
needed to understand and assess the historical practice of U.S. treaty 
terminations.  It describes both the allowable grounds under international 
law for terminating a treaty, as well as the textual and structural arguments 
relating to the Constitution’s assignment of treaty termination authority.  It 
also considers some of the reasons why historical practice has played a 
significant role in constitutional debates surrounding this issue.  Parts II 
and III review the practice of treaty termination throughout U.S. history.  
Part II shows that, at least until the late nineteenth century, it was generally 
understood that presidents needed the agreement of Congress or the Senate 
in order to terminate a treaty.  Part III recounts how this understanding 
changed in the twentieth century, a process that occurred over the course of 
decades as a result of repeated claims and actions by the Executive Branch 
in the face of congressional inaction.  Part IV assesses the implications of 
the case study, both with respect to the specific question of treaty-
termination authority as well as the more general issue of the proper role of 
historical practice in the separation of powers area.  It concludes by 
reflecting on the relationship between law and politics for practice-based 
norms of institutional authority. 
I. Legal and Theoretical Background 
This Part provides the legal and theoretical background needed to 
understand and assess the historical practice of U.S. treaty terminations.  It 
begins by explaining the circumstances under which international law 
allows a nation to terminate a treaty.  It then considers the textual and 
structural considerations that are relevant to determining which actors in the 
United States have the constitutional authority to terminate treaties.  
Finally, it describes why historical practice plays an especially important 
role in constitutional debates concerning this issue. 
A. International-Law Standards 
Treaties are binding on nations as a matter of international law.  
Ultimately, therefore, whether a nation’s treaty commitments are terminated 
is determined by international law, not U.S. law.5  As a result, before 
considering the U.S. constitutional issues, it is important to understand first 
what international law provides about treaty termination.  The modern rules 
 
agreement on his own authority, sometimes doing so when requested by Congress or by the 
Senate alone.”). 
5. See generally Laurence R. Helfer, Terminating Treaties, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO 
TREATIES 634 (Duncan B. Hollis ed., 2012) (describing the international-law standards governing 
treaty termination). 
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on this subject are set forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties,6 which took effect in 1980 and has now been ratified by over 110 
nations.7  Although the United States is not a party to the Convention, 
Executive Branch officials have stated at various times that they regard the 
Convention as largely reflective of binding rules of international custom,8 
and U.S. courts also regularly refer to the Convention.9  In addition, the 
International Court of Justice has specifically observed that “in many 
respects” the Vienna Convention’s provisions on the suspension or 
termination of treaty provisions reflect binding custom.10 
Under the Convention, there are a variety of circumstances that can 
render a party’s consent to a treaty invalid.  Some of these circumstances 
merely make the treaty voidable at the party’s discretion.  For example, “[i]f 
a State has been induced to conclude a treaty by the fraudulent conduct of 
another negotiating State, the State may invoke the fraud as invalidating its 
consent to be bound by the treaty.”11  Other circumstances automatically 
void the treaty.  For example, “[a] treaty is void if its conclusion has been 
procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of 
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.”12  When a 
treaty is deemed void, it will be considered never to have created 
obligations.13 
Whereas some circumstances will allow a party to void even its past 
treaty obligations, other circumstances will allow it to terminate or suspend 
its treaty obligations going forward.  For example, a party may suspend or 
terminate its obligations under a bilateral treaty if the other treaty party has 
materially breached the treaty.14  In addition, “[a] party may invoke the 
impossibility of performing a treaty as a ground for terminating or 
 
6. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter 
VCLT]. 
7. Chapter XXIII of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, UNITED 
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (last updated Feb. 3, 2014), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/View 
DetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII~1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en. 
8. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
pt. 3, intro. note (1987) (documenting Executive Branch statements); see also Maria Frankowska, 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 
281, 286 (1988) (“[A]ccording to a widespread opinio juris, legal conviction of the international 
community, the Vienna Convention represents a treaty which to a large degree is a restatement of 
customary rules . . . .”). 
9. See, e.g., Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 196 n.19 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Although the United 
States has not ratified the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, our Court relies on it ‘as an 
authoritative guide to the customary international law of treaties,’ insofar as it reflects actual state 
practices.”). 
10. Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, para. 46 (Sept. 25). 
11. VCLT, supra note 6, art. 49. 
12. Id. art. 52. 
13. See id. art. 69, para. 1 (“The provisions of a void treaty have no legal force.”). 
14. Id. art. 60, para. 1. 
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withdrawing from it if the impossibility results from the permanent 
disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of 
the treaty.”15  Furthermore, under narrow circumstances, a party may invoke 
a fundamental change of circumstances as a basis for suspending or 
terminating a treaty.16  Treaty obligations can also be suspended or 
terminated if the parties expressly agree to such suspension or termination 
or act to conclude a new superseding treaty, or if the treaty expressly 
provides for suspension or termination after a certain period of time or in 
response to certain events.17 
Finally, nations may also withdraw from (or “denounce”) a treaty that 
expressly provides for a right of withdrawal.18  Such withdrawal clauses are 
common in modern treaties and often include a required notice period 
before the termination will take effect.19  In some instances, a right of 
withdrawal will be implied.  The Vienna Convention states that: 
A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination and 
which does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject 
to denunciation or withdrawal unless: (a) it is established that the 
parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or 
withdrawal; or (b) a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be 
implied by the nature of the treaty.20 
When there is an implied right of withdrawal, the Vienna Convention states 
that the party seeking to withdraw from the treaty shall give at least twelve 
months’ notice.21  A nation that withdraws from a treaty is bound by any 
obligations that arose before the effective date of the withdrawal.22 
The rules of treaty termination that existed at the time of the 
constitutional founding were less developed and incorporated distinctions 
that are no longer relevant, such as a distinction between treaties that 
obligated only the particular monarchs making them and treaties that 
obligated their nations in perpetuity.23  Nevertheless, these rules 
encompassed certain grounds for terminating a treaty that we would 
recognize today, such as a material breach by the other party.24  It is worth 
 
15. Id. art. 61, para. 1. 
16. Id. art. 62, para. 1. 
17. Id. arts. 54, 57, 59. 
18. The terms “denunciation” and “withdrawal” are often used interchangeably to refer to a 
voluntary act of treaty termination.  Helfer, supra note 5, at 635. 
19. See Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1581–82, 1597–98 (2005). 
20. VCLT, supra note 6, art. 56, para. 1. 
21. Id. art. 56, para. 2. 
22. Id. art. 70, para. 1(b). 
23. See, e.g., 1 E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 
bk. 2, §§ 187–197 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1916) (1758). 
24. See, e.g., JEAN-JACQUES BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW 
524 (Petter Korkman ed., Thomas Nugent trans., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2006) (1763); 2 HUGO 
GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES 405 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Clarendon Press 
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noting, however, that although clauses in treaties allowing for unilateral 
withdrawal are now common, they were not common at the time of the 
founding.  Indeed, it appears that the United States did not become a party 
to a treaty containing a unilateral withdrawal clause until 1822.25 
What international law did not address then, and still does not address, 
is how treaty termination decisions are to be made internally by each nation.  
For the United States, that internal issue is a matter of U.S. constitutional 
law. 
B. Textual and Structural Considerations 
Article II of the Constitution sets forth the process by which the United 
States is to conclude treaties.  It provides that the President “shall have 
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, 
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”26  The vast majority of 
international agreements concluded by the United States in the modern era 
do not go through this process and are instead concluded as “congressional–
executive agreements” (approved before or after the fact by a majority of 
Congress) or “sole executive agreements” (approved solely by the 
President).27  Nevertheless, some of the United States’ most significant 
agreements are still concluded as Article II treaties.  To take just a few 
examples, the United Nations Charter, the Geneva Conventions, and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights were all concluded 
 
1925) (1646); 2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO 1339–40 
(C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., Clarendon Press 1934) (1688); VATTEL, supra note 23, 
§ 202; see also Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 261 (1796) (Iredell, J.) (“It is a part of the 
law of nations, that if a treaty be violated by one party, it is at the option of the other party, if 
innocent, to declare, in consequence of the breach, that the treaty is void.”). 
25. The treaty concerned the imposition of customs duties, and it provided that it was to 
remain in force for two years “and even after the expiration of that term, until the conclusion of a 
definitive treaty, or until one of the parties shall have declared its intention to renounce it; which 
declaration shall be made at least six months before hand.”  Convention of Navigation and 
Commerce, U.S.–Fr., art. 7, June 24, 1822, 8 Stat. 278; see also Memorandum from William 
Whittington, Termination of Treaties: International Rules and Internal United States Procedure 3 
(Feb. 10, 1958) [hereinafter Whittington Memorandum] (on file with author) (noting that the 1822 
treaty was the first treaty concluded by the United States containing a unilateral withdrawal 
clause).  The withdrawal clause was included at the request of France, which explained that, “As 
their object is to make an experiment, it should be so established as not to press too heavily upon 
whichever of the two parties may, on experience, be found to have erred in the calculation.”  
Letter from G. Hyde de Neuville, Envoy Extraordinary, to John Quincy Adams, Sec’y of State 
(May 15, 1822), in 5 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: DOCUMENTS, LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE, OF 
THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 210, 211 (Asbury Dickins & James C. Allen eds., Wash., 
Gales & Seaton 1858). 
26. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
27. See CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM 74–75 
(2013); Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International 
Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1287–88 (2008).  The constitutional issues 
implicated by the termination of executive agreements are potentially distinct from those 
implicated by the termination of Article II treaties, and they are not considered here. 
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through the senatorial advice and consent process.  To the extent that the 
United States ever becomes a party to treaties such as the Law of the Sea 
Convention, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, or the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, it is expected that it will do so pursuant to the Article II process.28  
The Constitution does not specifically address, however, the way in which 
the United States is to go about terminating treaty commitments. 
Some proponents of unilateral presidential authority to terminate 
treaties rely on what has been referred to as the “Vesting Clause Thesis.”  
According to this thesis, the first sentence of Article II of the Constitution, 
which provides that “[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of 
the United States of America,”29 conveys to the President all authority that 
is “executive” in nature, regardless of whether that authority is specifically 
mentioned in the remainder of Article II, unless the Constitution 
specifically conveys that authority to another institutional actor.30  This 
thesis supports a unilateral presidential authority to terminate treaties, it is 
argued, because the termination of treaties is executive in nature and is not 
specifically assigned to an actor other than the President.31  The Vesting 
Clause Thesis, however, is highly controversial.32  Moreover, supporters of 
this thesis vary in what authority they contend is conveyed by the clause.33 
A variety of structural considerations are also potentially relevant to 
determining who has the treaty termination power in the United States, but 
these considerations do not point in a single direction.  On the one hand, the 
 
28. To the extent that presidents have proposed moving ahead with ratification of these 
treaties, they have always suggested that the process would be the one set forth in Article II.  For 
the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court, Congress has specifically mandated that it 
can be ratified by the United States only through the Article II process.  22 U.S.C. § 7401(a) 
(2012). 
29. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
30. For arguments in support of the thesis, see, for example, Saikrishna B. Prakash & 
Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001), and 
John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1677–78 (2002).  See 
also MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 158 (2007) 
(applying this thesis to the issue of treaty termination). 
31. See RAMSEY, supra note 30. 
32. For criticism of the thesis, see, for example, Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, 
Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 551 (2004), and 
Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259, 263–64 (2009).  See 
also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640–41 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (“If [the Vesting Clause Thesis] be true, it is difficult to see why the forefathers 
bothered to add several specific items [in Article II], including some trifling ones.”). 
33. For example, unlike Professors Prakash, Ramsey, and Yoo, Steven Calabresi and Kevin 
Rhodes contend simply that “the Clause grants the President the power to supervise and control all 
subordinate executive officials exercising executive power conferred explicitly by either the 
Constitution or a valid statute,” and they do not make “the more ambitious (and far more doubtful) 
claim” that it conveys substantive authority.  See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The 
Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1177 
n.119 (1992). 
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making of treaties might be viewed as analogous to the appointment of 
Executive Branch officers.  Even though such appointment requires, as for 
treaties, senatorial advice and consent (albeit a majority of the Senate rather 
than two-thirds), it is well settled that presidents have some unilateral 
authority to remove executive officers.34  On the other hand, the making of 
treaties could be viewed as analogous to the making of federal statutes, 
since both are part of the supreme law of the land.  It is well settled that the 
same process that applies to the making of federal statutes (approval by a 
majority of both houses of Congress and presidential signature, or a 
supermajority congressional override of a presidential veto) also must be 
followed for the termination of federal statutes.35 
Another structural consideration concerns Congress’s well-accepted 
authority to override the domestic effect of a treaty by enacting a later-in-
time inconsistent statute.36  If that is all that Congress does, the 
international-law status of the treaty will continue, and the United States 
may end up in breach of its international obligations.37  The fact that 
Congress has the authority to terminate the domestic effect of a treaty might 
suggest that it also can have a role in terminating the treaty’s international-
law effect, but the second power does not necessarily follow from the first.  
Conversely, even if the President has the unilateral authority to terminate a 
treaty internationally, it would not necessarily mean that he could (like 
Congress) terminate its domestic effect without having validly terminated 
its international-law effect.  In fact, if treaties are part of the “Laws” that the 
President is obligated under Article II of the Constitution to take care to 
 
34. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3146 
(2010) (“Since 1789, the Constitution has been understood to empower the President to keep 
[executive] officers accountable—by removing them from office, if necessary.”). 
35. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998) (“There is no provision 
in the Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes.”); INS v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983) (“[R]epeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform 
with Art. I.”). 
36. See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (per curiam); The Chinese 
Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 193–95 (1888); 
see also La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 460 (1899) (“It has been 
adjudged that Congress by legislation, and so far as the people and authorities of the United States 
are concerned, could abrogate a treaty made between this country and another country which had 
been negotiated by the President and approved by the Senate.”). 
37. See, e.g., Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291 
U.S. 138, 160 (1934) (noting that although a federal statute that conflicted with a treaty provision 
“would control in our courts as the later expression of our municipal law, . . . the international 
obligation [would] remain[] unaffected”).  Courts will attempt to construe statutes, however, to 
avoid a treaty violation if possible.  See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933) (“A 
treaty will not be deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a later statute unless such 
purpose on the part of Congress has been clearly expressed.”); see also BRADLEY, supra note 27, 
at 54–55 (explaining reasons for this canon of construction). 
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faithfully execute (as a number of scholars have concluded),38 it may be 
constitutionally impermissible for the President to override the domestic 
effect of a treaty that is otherwise still in force. 
Still another structural consideration is the role of the Executive 
Branch in communicating with foreign nations.  The President has often 
been described as the “sole organ” of formal communications between the 
United States and the rest of the world, a role that is arguably implied from 
both the unitary nature of the Executive Branch as well as the President’s 
constitutional authority to make treaties and appoint and receive 
ambassadors.39  To be sure, the phrase “sole organ” is an overstatement, 
given that Congress often takes positions on matters of foreign policy and 
that members of Congress regularly interact with foreign officials.40  But it 
has always been the case that formal diplomatic functions are handled by 
the Executive Branch.41  Because a termination of a treaty needs to be 
communicated to the other treaty parties, the “sole organ” role of the 
President may mean that neither Congress nor the Senate can effectuate by 
themselves a treaty termination.  This would not necessarily establish, of 
course, that the President has unilateral authority to terminate a treaty.  
After all, it is understood that no treaty can be ratified except through 
presidential action,42 and yet the President is required to obtain the advice 
and consent of two-thirds of the Senate before engaging in such ratification.  
The President’s “sole organ” authority might mean, however, that Congress 
cannot validly require the President to terminate a treaty. 
 
38. E.g., Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound By the Geneva Conventions?, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 97, 157–58 (2004); Michael D. Ramsey, Torturing Executive Power, 93 GEO. 
L.J. 1213, 1231–32 (2005); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (stating that the President “shall take 
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”).  It is not clear whether treaties must be “self-
executing” in order to qualify as “Laws” for this purpose. 
39. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (referring 
to “the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal 
government in the field of international relations”); see also 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800) 
(describing a statement by John Marshall, made when serving as a Representative in Congress, 
that “[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole 
representative with foreign nations”); Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1 (June 29, 1793), 
reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33, 38 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds., 1969) 
(describing the Executive Branch as “the organ of intercourse between the Nation and foreign 
Nations”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Charles Genet (Nov. 22, 1793), in 27 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 414, 414 (John Catanzariti et al. eds., 1997) (stating that the 
President is the “only channel of communication” between the United States and foreign nations). 
40. See, e.g., Ryan M. Scoville, Legislative Diplomacy, 112 MICH. L. REV. 331 (2013) 
(describing various forms of interactions between legislators and foreign nations and officials). 
41. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 41–45 
(2d ed. 1996) (describing the longstanding view of the Executive Branch as having exclusive 
power to conduct diplomacy). 
42. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 106TH CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 152 (Comm. Print 2001) [hereinafter 
CRS STUDY] (stating that a failure to ratify a treaty on the part of the President means that the 
treaty “cannot enter into force for the United States”). 
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Finally, it is conceivable that the President might have some 
constitutional authority to suspend treaty obligations even if he or she did 
not have constitutional authority to terminate the obligations.  As noted, the 
President has the obligation and authority to “take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.”43  As part of his Take Care Clause responsibilities, the 
President necessarily makes judgments (at least within certain limits) about 
the levels of enforcement of federal law.44  It is arguable that this authority 
encompasses the ability to direct a temporary suspension of U.S. 
compliance with a treaty while a dispute concerning the treaty is addressed. 
C. Importance of Historical Practice 
The historical practice of U.S. treaty termination is described in detail 
in Parts II and III.  As will be seen, when there has been debate over how 
treaties can constitutionally be terminated, such as in Congress or the 
courts, the debate has often focused on historical practice.45  Moreover, 
Executive Branch lawyers have focused heavily on historical practice in 
advising presidents and secretaries of state about their constitutional 
authority concerning treaty termination.46  Scholars, too, have long 
accorded historical practice a prominent place in the legal analysis of this 
issue.47 
Consider two modern controversies.  In the 1970s, there was extensive 
debate over the issue of treaty termination in the wake of President Carter’s 
announcement that he was terminating a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan 
in conjunction with his decision to recognize the People’s Republic of 
China.48  The congressional hearings, scholarly commentary, and judicial 
decisions relating to that controversy were all heavily focused on historical 
practice.49  So was the Executive Branch’s reasoning: In a memorandum to 
 
43. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
44. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) (“The dynamic nature of 
relations with other countries requires the Executive Branch to ensure that enforcement policies 
[under the immigration laws] are consistent with this Nation’s foreign policy with respect to these 
and other realities.”); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985) (“An agency generally 
cannot act against each technical violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing.  The agency 
is far better equipped than the courts to deal with the many variables involved in the proper 
ordering of its priorities.”); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (“In our criminal 
justice system, the Government retains ‘broad discretion’ as to whom to prosecute.”).  There are 
presumably limits on this enforcement discretion.  See, e.g., Zachary S. Price, Enforcement 
Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (considering the scope of 
the Executive Branch’s enforcement discretion). 
45. See infra Parts II–III. 
46. See, e.g., infra subpart III(C) (describing how the State Department Legal Adviser relied 
heavily on historical practice when advising the President that he had authority to terminate a 
treaty with Taiwan). 
47. See infra subparts II(E), III(E). 
48. See infra subpart III(C). 
49. See infra subpart III(C). 
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the Secretary of State advising him that the President had the constitutional 
authority to terminate the Taiwan treaty, for example, the Legal Adviser to 
the State Department cited twelve purported instances in which presidents 
had terminated treaties unilaterally and attached an appendix describing the 
“History of Treaty Termination by the United States.”50 
More recently, there was controversy in 2002 over President 
George W. Bush’s announcement that he was unilaterally withdrawing the 
United States from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with Russia.51  
Again, the Executive Branch relied extensively on historical practice.  In 
concluding that President Bush had the unilateral authority to suspend or 
terminate the ABM Treaty, the Justice Department’s Office of Legal 
Counsel argued that “[t]he executive branch has long held the view that the 
President has the constitutional authority to terminate treaties unilaterally, 
and the legislative branch seems for the most part to have acquiesced in 
it.”52 
There are a number of reasons why historical practice has played such 
a prominent role in discussions of this issue.  As a general matter, 
arguments based on historical practice are a common feature of debates and 
decisions relating to the constitutional separation of powers.53  This is 
especially true in debates and decisions relating to the scope of presidential 
power.  Unlike the extensive list of powers granted to Congress, the text of 
the Constitution says relatively little about the scope of presidential 
authority.54  Responding in part to this limited textual guidance, Justice 
Frankfurter emphasized the importance of historical practice to the 
interpretation of presidential power in his concurrence in the Youngstown 
steel seizure case.  In his view, “[i]t is an inadmissibly narrow conception of 
American constitutional law to confine it to the words of the Constitution 
and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon them.”55 
 
50. See infra notes 223–24 and accompanying text. 
51. See infra notes 252–58 and accompanying text. 
52. Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. & Robert J. Delahunty, 
Special Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to John Bellinger, III, Senior 
Assoc. Counsel to the President & Legal Adviser to the Nat’l Sec. Council, Authority of the 
President to Suspend Certain Provisions of the ABM Treaty 15–16 (Nov. 15, 2001) [hereinafter 
Yoo & Delahunty Memorandum], available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memoabmtreaty 
11152001.pdf. 
53. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 417–24.  Practice-based arguments are also common 
in other areas of constitutional law, such as federalism.  Invocations of practice in those areas raise 
issues that are potentially distinct from the issues considered here.  See id. at 416–17. 
54. Id. at 417–18. 
55. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring); see also, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 401 (1989) (noting that 
“‘traditional ways of conducting government . . . give meaning’ to the Constitution” (omission in 
original) (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring))); Dames & Moore v. 
Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (“Past practice does not, by itself, create power, but ‘long-
continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a presumption that the 
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When constitutional controversies implicate foreign relations, 
invocations of historical practice are particularly common, in part because 
of the lower level of judicial review in that area.56  For example, a frequent 
argument in support of the constitutionality of “executive agreements” (that 
is, binding international agreements concluded by the President without 
obtaining the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate) is the fact that 
presidents have long concluded such agreements.57  Similarly, debates over 
the scope of the President’s authority to initiate the use of military force in 
the absence of congressional authorization have been heavily informed by 
past uses of force.58  Yet another example is the scope of the President’s 
authority to determine which foreign governments are recognized by the 
United States.59 
Nevertheless, appeals to historical practice are not confined to matters 
relating to foreign affairs.  For example, the Supreme Court has emphasized 
longstanding presidential practice when considering when the President’s 
“pocket veto” (that is, failure to sign a bill before Congress recesses) should 
be deemed to operate.60  Similarly, in concluding that the President’s pardon 
power extended to a contempt of court conviction, the Court reasoned that 
“long practice under the pardoning power and acquiescence in it strongly 
sustains the construction it is based on.”61  Moreover, as Trevor Morrison 
and I have noted elsewhere, “arguments about the scope of both the 
‘executive privilege’ (concerning the ability to withhold internal executive 
branch communications from the other branches of government) and the 
 
[action] had been [taken] in pursuance of its consent . . . .’” (alterations in original) (quoting 
United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915))); WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, OUR 
CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 135 (1916) (“Executive power is sometimes created by 
custom, and so strong is the influence of custom that it seems almost to amend the Constitution.”). 
56. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 420, 456. 
57. See, e.g., Whether Uru. Round Agreements Required Ratification as a Treaty, 18 Op. 
O.L.C. 232, 234 (1994) (“[P]ractice under the Constitution has established that the United States 
can assume major international trade obligations such as those found in the Uruguay Round 
Agreements when they are negotiated by the President and approved and implemented by Act of 
Congress . . . .”); see also Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 468–76 (describing the role of 
historical practice in debates over the validity of congressional–executive agreements). 
58. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 461–68 (describing the role of historical practice 
in the war powers area).  Compare, e.g., Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 
(Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/olc/2011/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf (relying on 
historical practice in support of the argument that President Obama had the unilateral authority to 
initiate the use of military force in Libya), with Michael J. Glennon, The Cost of “Empty Words”: 
A Comment on the Justice Department’s Libya Opinion, HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J.F. 1, 3–4 
(2011) (arguing that historical practice did not support the exercise of this authority). 
59. For a recent example, see Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 725 F.3d 197, 
207 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“We conclude that longstanding post-ratification practice supports the 
Secretary’s position that the President exclusively holds the recognition power.”). 
60. See The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929) (“Long settled and established 
practice is a consideration of great weight in a proper interpretation of constitutional provisions of 
this character.”). 
61. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 118–19 (1925). 
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‘legislative privilege’ (concerning, among other things, the internal powers 
of the two houses of Congress) are commonly informed by historical 
practice.”62 
On these and other separation of powers issues, lawyers and judges 
trained in the common law naturally look for precedent in evaluating legal 
claims, and when judicial precedent is lacking, it is not surprising that they 
turn to other forms of precedent.63  Executive Branch agencies such as the 
Office of Legal Counsel also give weight to historical practice for reasons 
somewhat akin to the reasons that courts give weight to their own prior 
decisions under the doctrine of stare decisis, such as decisional efficiency 
and the protection of reliance interests.64  Historical practice is particularly 
likely to be invoked for separation of powers issues not specifically 
addressed by the constitutional text,65 as is the case for treaty termination.  
Among other things, when the implications of text are perceived to be 
unclear, appeals to past practice allow for a type of principled reasoning 
that might not otherwise be possible.66 
To say that reliance on historical practice is unsurprising in this 
context is not to say that it is normatively attractive, and some of the 
tradeoffs associated with this sort of constitutional reasoning are explored 
in Part IV.  One particular difficulty with a practice-based approach to the 
separation of powers is worth noting here: Most accounts of how historical 
practice can inform constitutional interpretation in this context require that 
the branch of government that is affected by a practice “acquiesce” in it 
before it is credited.67  As Trevor Morrison and I have explained, however, 
 
62. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 421; see also JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S 
PRIVILEGED FEW 3–19 (2007); Archibald Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 
1384–405 (1974). 
63. For a general consideration of the role of nonjudicial precedent in constitutional law, see 
Michael J. Gerhardt, Non-Judicial Precedent, 61 VAND. L. REV. 713 (2008). 
64. See, e.g., Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1448 (2010). 
65. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 455–56. 
66. See id. 
67. See, e.g., Glennon, supra note 1, at 134 (“[T]he branch placed on notice must have 
acquiesced in the custom.”); Harold Hongju Koh, Focus: Foreign Affairs Under the United States 
Constitution, 13 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 3 n.7 (1988) (“Under the heading of ‘quasi-constitutional 
custom,’ I would of course include executive practice of which Congress has approved or in 
which it has acquiesced.”); Peter J. Spiro, War Powers and the Sirens of Formalism, 68 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1338, 1356 (1993) (reviewing JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: 
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993)) (“[T]he other branch must 
have accepted or acquiesced in the action.”); Jane E. Stromseth, Understanding Constitutional 
War Powers Today: Why Methodology Matters, 106 YALE L.J. 845, 880 (1996) (reviewing LOUIS 
FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (1995)) (“Congress . . . must not only be on notice of an 
executive practice and accompanying claim of authority to act; it also must accept or acquiesce in 
that practice and claim of authority.”); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 680 
(1981) (“Crucial to our decision today is the conclusion that Congress has implicitly approved the 
practice of claim settlement by executive agreement.”). 
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acquiescence is a problematic concept, especially as applied to Congress.68  
Among other things, accounts of congressional acquiescence often assume 
a “Madisonian” model of interbranch rivalry that probably does not 
describe modern congressional–executive relations.69  A number of factors 
contribute to the descriptive inaccuracy of this model, including the modern 
party system, which reduces the incentives of individual members of 
Congress to act systematically in constraining executive power or resisting 
executive aggrandizement.70  If nothing else, the limitations with the 
acquiescence concept suggest that there should be a high bar for claims of 
congressional acquiescence and that greater attention should be paid to 
potential indications of congressional nonacquiescence that fall short of the 
enactment of contrary legislation, such as various forms of congressional 
“soft law.”71 
In theory, the courts could determine whether and to what extent the 
historical practice relating to treaty termination should be credited.  A 
variety of justiciability limitations, however, make this unlikely.  The 
Supreme Court declined to resolve the dispute over the termination of the 
Taiwan Treaty because of these limitations, with four Justices concluding 
that the case presented a political question and Justice Powell concluding 
that the case was not ripe for judicial review.72  Since that decision, the 
Supreme Court has sharply limited the standing of members of Congress to 
challenge presidential action.73  In 2002, a federal district court dismissed a 
suit brought by thirty-two members of Congress challenging President 
Bush’s termination of the ABM treaty, based on both a lack of standing and 
the political question doctrine.74  For these reasons, it can be expected that 
 
68. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 432–47. 
69. See id. at 438–47; see also Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive 
Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 671 (2011) (“[A]ll indications are 
that political ‘ambition counteracting ambition’ has failed to serve as a self-enforcing safeguard 
for the constitutional structures of federalism and separation of powers in the way that Madison 
seems to have envisioned.”); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 865, 884 (2007) (“Whether or not this [Madisonian] picture was ever realistic, it is 
no longer so today.”). 
70. See generally Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 2311 (2006). 
71. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 446, 450.  For discussion of congressional soft 
law, see generally Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715 (2012), and 
Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. 
REV. 573 (2008). 
72. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997–1006 (1979). 
73. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 823–24 (1997) (holding that members of Congress 
generally do not have standing to sue for injury to their institution absent a showing that their 
votes have been “completely nullified”). 
74. Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2002); see also Beacon Prods. Co. v. 
Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191, 1198–99 (D. Mass. 1986), aff’d, 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987) (relying 
on the political question doctrine to dismiss a challenge to a treaty termination by President 
Reagan). 
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historical practice will continue to develop relating to this issue and that 
disputes will continue to be resolved outside the courts. 
* * * 
The next two Parts of this Article consider the historical practice of 
U.S. treaty terminations.75  Part II shows that, at least until the late 
nineteenth century, it was generally understood that presidents needed the 
agreement of Congress or the Senate in order to terminate a treaty.  Part III 
describes the shift during the twentieth century towards unilateral 
presidential termination of treaties.  As will be seen, the shift did not 
happen all at once but rather occurred over the course of decades as a result 
of repeated claims and actions by the Executive Branch in the face of 
congressional inaction.  When a controversy finally did develop over this 
question of institutional authority—in connection with President Carter’s 
termination of the Taiwan treaty—the President was able to plausibly 
maintain that his action was consistent with longstanding practice. 
II. Founding Through the Early Twentieth Century 
This Part reviews the instances, during the period from the 
constitutional founding through the early twentieth century, in which the 
United States announced that it was terminating or suspending treaty 
obligations.  In doing so, it divides the practice into four categories: 
●  termination pursuant to ex ante congressional authorization or 
directive; 
●  termination pursuant to senatorial authorization; 
●  termination with post hoc congressional or senatorial approval; and 
●  unilateral presidential termination. 
The historical practice reviewed here includes instances in which the United 
States ultimately decided not to terminate a treaty after announcing its 
intention of doing so, on the theory that such instances can shed light on the 
constitutional understandings of the President and Congress.76 
 
75. For additional discussion of the historical practice, see DAVID GRAY ADLER, THE 
CONSTITUTION AND THE TERMINATION OF TREATIES 149–247 (1986); SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, 
TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT §§ 178–186 (2d ed. 1916); 5 GREEN HAYWOOD 
HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 509 (1943).  There is also extensive discussion 
of the historical practice in the Senate hearings regarding President Carter’s termination of the 
Taiwan treaty in subpart III(C) infra, as well as in the various State Department memoranda that 
are referred to throughout this Article. 
76. If, for example, a President initiates a unilateral termination and Congress does not object, 
that would seem to be a relevant event even if the President decides to withdraw the termination 
for policy reasons.  The approach of this Article therefore differs from that of David Adler, who 
suggests in his 1986 book on treaty termination that instances in which the termination was not 
fulfilled are not relevant in discerning the constitutional practice of treaty termination.  See 
ADLER, supra note 75, at 164–65, 170, 184–85. 
BRADLEY.FINAL.RESUBMIT.OC (DO NOT DELETE) 3/24/2014  12:07 PM 
2014] Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss 789 
A. Congressional Authorization or Directive 
In the first instance in which the United States purported to terminate 
treaties, Congress played an especially direct role.  In 1798, on the eve of 
war with France, Congress passed (and President Adams signed) legislation 
stating that the four treaties the United States had at that time with France 
“shall not henceforth be regarded as legally obligatory on the government 
or citizens of the United States.”77  In the congressional debates over 
whether to enact the statute, there does not appear to have been any doubt 
about Congress’s constitutional authority to terminate the treaties.  One 
member of the House did observe that “[i]n most countries it is in the power 
of the Chief Magistrate to suspend a treaty whenever he thinks proper,” but 
he noted that “here Congress only has that power.”78  Several years later, 
Thomas Jefferson referred to this episode in his Manual of Parliamentary 
Practice, observing that “[t]reaties being declared, equally with the laws of 
the U[nited] States, to be the supreme law of the land, it is understood that 
an act of the legislature alone can declare them infringed and rescinded.  
This was accordingly the process adopted in the case of France in 1798.”79 
Notwithstanding Jefferson’s contention that legislative action was the 
exclusive method of terminating a treaty, the 1798 statute appears to be the 
only instance in U.S. history in which the full Congress purported to 
effectuate a termination directly.  As noted in subpart I(B), it has generally 
been understood that formal communications between the United States and 
other nations are channeled through the Executive Branch.  A possible 
exception to that “sole organ” role for the Executive, however, is 
Congress’s authority to declare war.  A state of war was understood as 
terminating certain types of treaty relationships, such as treaties of 
alliance.80  So one way of understanding Congress’s termination of the 
 
77. Act of July 7, 1798, ch. 67, 1 Stat. 578, 578.  Congress had already passed other war-
related measures by that point.  See ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QUASI-WAR 102 (1966) 
(discussing a direct property tax enacted to pay for the expanded war program). 
78. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2120 (1798).  For additional discussion of the debate in Congress, 
see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–1801, 
at 250–53 (1997). 
79. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE § 52 (Wash., Samuel 
Harrison Smith 1801); see also Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 261 (1796) (Iredell, J.) 
(suggesting that only Congress has the authority to terminate a treaty based on a violation by the 
other party).  Many years later, the U.S. Court of Claims held that the French treaties had been 
validly terminated by Congress.  See Hooper v. United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 408, 418 (1887) (“The 
treaties therefore ceased to be a part of the supreme law of the land . . . .”); see also Chirac v. 
Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 272 (1817) (assuming that the treaties had been terminated in 
deciding a related property claim).  During negotiations between the United States and France in 
1800, however, France took the position that the U.S. treaty obligations had not been terminated 
(although not because of any claim that Congress was unable to terminate treaties).  5 JOHN 
BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 774, at 357 (1906). 
80. See, e.g., 2 VATTEL, supra note 23, bk. 3, § 175 (“Conventions and treaties are broken or 
annulled when war breaks out between the contracting parties . . . .”). 
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French treaties was as an exercise of its power to declare war (although 
Congress merely authorized naval warfare against France and did not 
formally declare war).81 
In any event, without purporting directly to effectuate terminations, 
Congress has authorized or directed presidential termination of treaties in a 
number of other instances.  In 1846, for example, Congress passed a joint 
resolution authorizing President Polk “at his discretion” to terminate a 
treaty with Great Britain relating to the two countries’ joint occupation of 
the Oregon Territory.82  This resolution was issued in response to a request 
from the President, in which he stated that a notice of termination would, in 
his judgment, “be proper to give, and I recommend that provision be made 
by law for giving it accordingly.”83  After Congress passed the resolution, 
the Secretary of State informed the U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain that 
“Congress have spoken their will upon the subject, in their joint resolution; 
and to this it is his (the President’s) and your duty to conform.”84  This was 
apparently the first time that the United States attempted to terminate a 
treaty pursuant to a unilateral withdrawal provision.  Before the expiration 
of the notice period, the United States and Great Britain negotiated a new 
treaty to supersede the one that the United States had acted to terminate. 
Prior to the issuance of the 1846 resolution, there was substantial 
debate in Congress over whether it was proper for the House of 
Representatives to be involved in the issue.  During that debate, a majority 
of those who spoke expressed the view that it was constitutionally proper 
for the full Congress to authorize termination.85  Several members of the 
House issued a minority report, however, arguing that, except when a treaty 
is being terminated pursuant to a declaration of war, authorization of treaty 
termination properly should come from a supermajority of the Senate, not 
the full Congress.86  No one argued for a unilateral presidential power to 
terminate.  
 
81. See The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884) (noting that a declaration of war 
“must be made by Congress, and . . . when made, usually suspends or destroys existing treaties 
between the nations thus at war”); cf. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 41 (1800) (Washington, J.) 
(concluding that France in 1799 qualified as an “enemy” within the meaning of a naval salvage 
statute and noting that “[C]ongress had raised an army; stopped all intercourse with France; 
dissolved our treaty; built and equipt ships of war; and commissioned private armed ships”). 
82. Joint Resolution of Apr. 27, 1846, 9 Stat. 109, 109–10. 
83. James K. Polk, First Annual Message (Dec. 2, 1845), in 5 A COMPILATION OF THE 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 2235, 2245 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897). 
84. S. DOC. NO. 29-489, at 15 (1st Sess. 1846). 
85. See CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 635 (1846). 
86. H.R. REP. NO. 29-34, at 1–3 (1984).  Some senators also expressed this view.  See, e.g., 
CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 635 (1846) (statement of Sen. Mangum) (contending that 
“[t]he power of treaty-making was one highly restricted by the Constitution—the Senate—two-
thirds of it—and the Executive possessed the power,” and, therefore, the Congress did not have 
the power to make or break a treaty).  For additional discussion of the debate in Congress, see 
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Congress authorized additional treaty terminations in 1865 and 1874 
without controversy.87  In 1876, President Grant informed Congress that 
Great Britain was not complying with an extradition provision in a treaty, 
and he stated that “[i]t is for the wisdom of Congress to determine whether 
the article of the treaty relating to extradition is to be any longer regarded as 
obligatory on the Government of the United States or as forming part of the 
supreme law of the land.”88  In the meantime, he indicated that he would not 
comply with extradition requests from Great Britain under the treaty 
“without an expression of the wish of Congress that I should do so.”89  
Extradition by the United States under the treaty was then suspended for six 
months until the dispute with Great Britain was resolved.90 
Sometimes Congress went beyond authorizing the President to 
terminate treaties and affirmatively ordered him to do so.  In 1883, for 
example, Congress directed President Arthur to terminate various articles in 
an 1871 treaty with Great Britain, and Arthur subsequently terminated the 
articles.91  In 1915, Congress, in the Seaman’s Act, “requested and directed” 
President Wilson to give notice of termination of various treaty obligations 
inconsistent with the Act,92 and Wilson proceeded to do so.93 
 
DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DESCENT INTO THE MAELSTROM, 1829–
1861, at 78–80 (2005). 
87. In 1865, Congress directed the President to terminate an 1854 Reciprocity Treaty with 
Great Britain that concerned trade with Canada, and the Johnson Administration subsequently did 
so.  See Joint Resolution of Jan. 18, 1865, 13 Stat. 566; see also Letter from Charles Francis 
Adams, Minister to the U.K., to William H. Seward, U.S. Sec’y of State (Mar. 23, 1865), in 
PAPERS RELATING TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS, pt. 1, at 258 (Wash., Gov’t Printing Office 1866); Letter 
from William H. Seward, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Charles Francis Adams, Minister to the U.K. 
(Jan. 18, 1865), in PAPERS RELATING TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra, at 93.  In 1874, Congress 
authorized the President to terminate a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Belgium, and 
President Grant immediately did so.  See Joint Resolution of June 17, 1874, 18 Stat. 287; Letter 
from Hamilton Fish, U.S. Sec’y of State, to J.R. Jones, Minister to Belgium (June 17, 1874), in 
PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 64 (Wash., Gov’t 
Printing Office 1874); see also Ulysses S. Grant, Sixth Annual Message (Dec. 7, 1874), in 10 A 
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 83, at 4238, 4242 
(reporting that “[t]he notice directed by the resolution of Congress of June 17, 1874, to be given to 
terminate the convention of July 17, 1858, between the United States and Belgium has been given, 
and the treaty will accordingly terminate on the 1st day of July, 1875”). 
88. Letter from Ulysses S. Grant to the Senate and House of Representatives (June 20, 1876), 
in 10 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 83, at 
4324, 4327. 
89. Id. 
90. CRANDALL, supra note 75, § 185, at 464. 
91. Joint Resolution of Mar. 3, 1883, 22 Stat. 641; Letter from Frederick T. Frelinghuysen, 
U.S. Sec’y of State, to J.R. Lowell, Minister to the U.K. (Apr. 5, 1883), in PAPERS RELATING TO 
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 413, 413–14 (Wash., Gov’t Printing Office 
1884). 
92. Seaman’s Act, ch. 153, § 16, 38 Stat. 1164, 1184 (1915). 
93. Circular from William Jennings Bryan, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Ambassador Page (May 29, 
1915), in PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (1924).  In 
Van Der Weyde v. Ocean Transport Co., 297 U.S. 114 (1936), the Supreme Court upheld the 
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At times, however, presidents argued that Congress could not 
constitutionally compel them to take certain actions relating to a treaty.  In 
1879, for example, President Hayes vetoed an immigration bill on the 
ground that it was trying to get him to partially terminate a treaty.  In the 
bill, Congress directed the President to terminate two provisions in a treaty 
with China relating to Chinese immigration.94  In his veto message, 
President Hayes conceded that Congress had the authority to terminate a 
treaty, and in fact said that this was “free from controversy.”95  But he 
pointed out that the bill called for the abrogation only of parts of a treaty 
and argued that “the power of making new treaties or modifying existing 
treaties is not lodged by the Constitution in Congress, but in the President, 
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”96 
In 1920, President Wilson refused to implement a provision in the 
Merchant Marine Act (also known as the Jones Act)97 that stated that he 
was “authorized and directed” to terminate within ninety days various treaty 
obligations that disallowed the United States from imposing discriminatory 
customs duties and tonnage dues.98  The State Department issued a press 
release explaining that, while the Act was seeking to have the President 
partially terminate treaties, the treaties in question did not allow for such 
partial termination.99  In explaining the proposed press release to the 
Undersecretary of State, the Solicitor for the State Department cited 
President Hayes’s reasoning in his veto of the Chinese immigration bill and 
noted that although “Congress may pass an act violative of a treaty” and 
“may express its sense that a treaty should be terminated,” it “cannot in 
effect undertake legally to modify a treaty.”100  Not surprisingly, Wilson’s 
 
termination of provisions in a treaty with Sweden and Norway pursuant to the directive in the 
Seaman’s Act and noted that it was unnecessary in that case to address “the authority of the 
Executive in the absence of congressional action, or of action by the treaty-making power, to 
denounce a treaty of the United States.”  Id. at 117. 
94. An Act to Restrict the Immigration of Chinese to the United States, H.R. 2423, 45th Cong. 
(1878). 
95. Rutherford B. Hayes, Veto of the Chinese Immigration Bill, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 45-
102, at 5 (3d Sess. 1879). 
96. Id. 
97. See Statement by State Department (Sept. 24, 1920), in 17 A COMPILATION OF THE 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 8871, 8871–72 (1927). 
98. Merchant Marine (Jones) Act, ch. 250, § 34, 41 Stat. 988, 1007 (1920). 
99. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State 2–3 (Sept. 6, 1920) (on file with author); see also 
President Won’t Denounce Treaties; Defies Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1920, 
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=F00F10FC345511738DDDAC0A94D 
1405B808EF1D3 (reporting on the State Department’s issuance of a press release explaining the 
President’s refusal to implement the Act to the extent it would entail the illegal termination of 
treaty obligations). 
100. Memorandum from the Solicitor of the Dep’t of State to Norman H. Davis, U.S. 
Undersecretary of State 2–3 (Sept. 6, 1920) (on file with author).  The Office of the Solicitor was 
the chief legal advisor to the State Department from 1891 to 1931 and was based within the 
Department of Justice.  Harold Hongju Koh, Remarks, The State Department Legal Adviser’s 
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refusal to implement this portion of the statute, after having signed the 
statute into law, generated controversy.101 
The next year, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes advised 
President Harding that a partial termination like the one contemplated by 
Congress in the Jones Act was not permissible under international law.  “As 
the existing treaties do not permit such partial termination by notice,” 
explained Hughes, “it follows that Congress has failed to give a mandate on 
which the President can act.”102  There was no suggestion, however, that 
Congress could not direct the President to terminate a treaty in its entirety. 
B. Senatorial Authorization 
The President has occasionally terminated a treaty based on prior 
authorization solely from the Senate.  In 1855, the Senate issued a 
resolution authorizing the President to terminate a Friendship, Commerce, 
and Navigation Treaty with Denmark, after President Pierce had indicated 
that he thought termination was warranted.103  In announcing the U.S. 
termination, President Pierce noted that he was acting “[i]n pursuance of the 
authority conferred by a resolution of the Senate.”104 
The following year, the Senate debated whether it could properly act in 
this manner without the involvement of the House of Representatives.  
Senator Charles Sumner argued that, because a treaty is part of the supreme 
law of the land, it should only be repealed through action of the full 
legislature.105  The Senate asked the Foreign Relations Committee to 
consider the issue, and the Committee prepared a report on the subject.  It 
concluded that termination pursuant to senatorial authorization was 
constitutionally proper, at least where, as here, the treaty specifically 
 
Office: Eight Decades in Peace and War, 100 GEO. L.J. 1747, 1750 (2012).  It was replaced in 
1931 by the Office of the Legal Adviser, which is based in the State Department.  Id. 
101. See Jesse S. Reeves, The Jones Act and the Denunciation of Treaties, 15 AM. J. INT’L L. 
33, 33–34, 37–38 (1921). 
102. Memorandum prepared by Charles E. Hughes, U.S. Sec’y of State, for President Harding 
30 (Oct. 8, 1921) (on file with author). 
103. See Franklin Pierce, Second Annual Message (Dec. 4, 1854), in 7 A COMPILATION OF 
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 83, at 2806, 2812 (stating that “I 
deem it expedient that the contemplated notice should be given to the Government of Denmark”). 
104. Franklin Pierce, Third Annual Message (Dec. 31, 1855), in 7 A COMPILATION OF THE 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 83, at 2860, 2867.  Some years earlier, 
Secretary of State James Buchanan had informed Denmark that, in order for the United States to 
withdraw from the treaty, “an Act must first pass Congress to enable the President to give the 
required notice.”  Letter from James Buchanan, Sec’y of State, to Robert P. Flenniken, Minister to 
Den. (Oct. 14, 1848), in 8 THE WORKS OF JAMES BUCHANAN, 220, 224 (John Bassett Moore ed., 
1909). 
105. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 600 (1856) (statement of Sen. Sumner).  Sumner, 
an ardent abolitionist, was apparently concerned that the pro-Southern Senate would seek to 
terminate a provision in the 1842 Webster–Ashburton Treaty that required patrols off the coast of 
Africa to suppress the slave trade.  Reeves, supra note 101, at 35. 
BRADLEY.FINAL.RESUBMIT.OC (DO NOT DELETE) 3/24/2014  12:07 PM 
794 Texas Law Review [Vol. 92:773 
allowed for unilateral withdrawal.  The Committee observed that, “so far as 
the ‘practice of the government’ is concerned, there is nothing to question 
the sufficiency of the notice that has been given to Denmark to terminate 
the treaty.”106  It appears that the only other instance of senatorial (as 
opposed to full congressional) involvement in a treaty termination occurred 
in 1921, when the Senate gave its advice and consent to U.S. termination of 
the International Sanitary Convention, based on a request from President 
Wilson.107 
C. Ex Post Congressional or Senatorial Approval 
Sometimes the President has acted to terminate a treaty and obtained 
subsequent approval from either the full Congress or the Senate.  In 1864, 
for example, President Lincoln gave notice of termination of the Great 
Lakes Agreement with Great Britain (also known as the Rush–Bagot 
Agreement), which limited the naval military presence of the United States 
on the Lakes, pursuant to a six-months’ notice provision in the 
Agreement.108  Congress subsequently passed a joint resolution (which 
Lincoln signed) “adopt[ing] and ratif[ying]” the termination “as if the same 
had been authorized by [C]ongress.”109  In the debate on this resolution, 
Senator Davis objected that Congress was creating a “mischievous 
precedent. . . .  which is to sanction and to give authority to an unauthorized 
act by the President.”110  Other senators agreed that Congress needed to 
approve the termination but thought that Congress could do so 
retroactively.111  Despite the Senate’s action, the President decided to 
 
106. S. REP. NO. 34-97, at 7–8 (1st Sess. 1856).  Senator Sumner (and other Senators) 
continued to dispute the point.  CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 1147 (1856).  For additional 
discussion of the debate in Congress, see CURRIE, supra note 86, at 80–84.  A resolution was 
proposed in the Senate that would have confirmed the validity of the Senate’s action, but it was 
never voted on.  CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 826 (1856). 
107. S. Res. of May 26, 1921, 67th Cong., 61 CONG. REC. 1793; see also 61 CONG. REC. 
1793–94 (1921) (providing the text of both President Wilson’s request for the Senate’s advice and 
consent to terminate the treaty and the Senate resolution providing this authorization).  For another 
reference to the idea of senatorial involvement in treaty termination, see Techt v. Hughes, 128 
N.E. 185, 192 (N.Y. 1920) (Cardozo, J.), where the court found a treaty with the Austro-
Hungarian Empire to still be in effect despite World War I and observed that the “President and 
senate may denounce the treaty, and thus terminate its life,” a statement that was quoted by the 
Supreme Court in Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 509 (1947). 
108. See Abraham Lincoln, Fourth Annual Message (Dec. 6, 1864), in 8 A COMPILATION OF 
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 83, at 3444, 3447.  Lincoln was 
responding to Confederate raids from Canada.  See id. 
109. Joint Resolution of Feb. 9, 1865, 13 Stat. 568. 
110. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 312 (1865); see also id. at 313 (Sen. Davis) (“[I]t is 
indispensably incumbent and necessary, in order to secure the termination of this treaty, that it 
shall be terminated not by the action of the President, but by the action of Congress.”). 
111. See, e.g., id. at 313 (Sen. Sumner); id. at 314–15 (Sen. Johnson). 
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rescind the notice of termination after further negotiations with Great 
Britain, so it never took effect.112 
Another example is President Taft’s action in 1911, when he gave 
notice to Russia of a termination of a commercial treaty.  In response to 
Russia’s mistreatment of American Jews, the House of Representatives had 
passed a strongly worded resolution demanding termination of the treaty 
(on a vote of 301 to 1),113 and the resolution was thought likely to pass in 
the Senate.114  Taft, who had been reluctant to terminate the treaty at all, 
was concerned that the harsh tone of the House resolution would needlessly 
offend Russia.115  He therefore quickly communicated his own statement of 
termination to Russia and submitted that statement to the Senate “with a 
view to its ratification and approval.”116  The Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee proposed a joint resolution stating that the notice of termination 
was “adopted and ratified,” and this resolution was subsequently passed by 
both houses of Congress (with the vote in the Senate being unanimous) and 
was signed by the President.117  The discussion in Congress primarily 
concerned whether the Senate or the full Congress should be involved in 
approving the termination, not whether the President had a unilateral power 
of termination.118 
 
112. ADLER, supra note 75, at 164–65. 
113. See 48 CONG. REC. 353 (1911).  In the deliberations on this resolution in the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, the prominent constitutional lawyer Louis Marshall testified that 
the proper procedure for terminating a treaty was by joint resolution of Congress.  He noted that 
he initially “had an idea that the executive department had ample power to deal with the matter,” 
but, after studying the historical practice, he had reached the conclusion “that the power rests in 
Congress.”  Termination of the Treaty of 1832 Between the United States and Russia: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 62d Cong. 42 (1911) (statement of Louis Marshall).  In 
his testimony, Marshall presented Congress with a memorandum (prepared by Herbert 
Friedenwald, Secretary of the American Jewish Committee) describing the past practice of treaty 
terminations, which was reprinted as an appendix to the committee hearings.  See id. at 49, app. III 
at 295. 
114. ADLER, supra note 75, at 181. 
115. Id. at 182. 
116. 48 CONG. REC. 453 (1911); see also Taft Himself May End Treaty, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 
1911, http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=F70D11FA395517738DDDA10994 
DA415B818DF1D3 (discussing the likelihood of Taft denouncing the Russian treaty and asking 
only for the Senate’s approval, thereby avoiding presidential approbation of the harsh statement in 
the House). 
117. See Joint Resolution of Dec. 21, 1911, 37 Stat. 627 (1911); 48 CONG. REC. 507 (1911) 
(recording the Senate vote); id. at 600 (documenting the fact that the President had signed the 
resolution). 
118. See 48 CONG. REC. 484 (statement of Senator Stone noting that the issue was whether the 
termination should be accomplished “with the joint sanction of the two Houses of Congress or 
whether it should be taken by the President with the approval of the Senate alone”).  Compare, 
e.g., id. at 473 (statement of Senator Rayner that “[a] treaty is the supreme law of the land under 
the language of the Constitution, and the supreme law of the land ought not to be set aside except 
by legislative action of both Houses”), with id. at 479 (statement of Senator Lodge that “in cases 
where treaties have involved no legislation the power of the Senate and the President to terminate 
a treaty by notice, or to arrest its operation . . . is absolute, because in making such a treaty the 
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Both of these episodes are obviously closer to presidential 
unilateralism than situations in which the President obtains advance 
authorization for a treaty termination.  Lincoln’s action was controversial 
for that reason.119  The Taft episode was less controversial because it was 
obvious when Taft acted that Congress supported termination of the treaty 
and was in fact the driving force behind the decision to terminate, and the 
only issue was over how the message would be conveyed to Russia.  It is 
also worth noting that, when writing some years later about presidential 
power, Taft made clear that he thought that “[t]he President may not annul 
or abrogate a treaty without the consent of the Senate unless he is given that 
specific authority by the terms of the treaty.”120 
D. Unilateral Presidential Termination 
In modern debates, the Executive Branch has sometimes claimed that 
the first unilateral presidential termination of a treaty occurred in 1815,121 
but that is erroneous.  The Madison administration observed that year that a 
treaty with The Netherlands, which had been concluded in 1782, had been 
“annulled” in light of the fact that The Netherlands had in the meantime 
been assimilated into the French Empire of Napoleon and then 
reconstructed in the Congress of Vienna.122  The observation occurred in 
response to a suggestion by The Netherlands that the two countries 
conclude a new treaty based on the terms of the old one, a suggestion that 
itself assumed that the old treaty was no longer in force.123  Under 
 
Senate and the President represent the high contracting party”).  Some members of the House of 
Representatives cited historical practice in support of the proposition that the full Congress could 
terminate a treaty.  See, e.g., id. at 319 (statement of Rep. Legare) (citing treaties that Congress 
had terminated in the past); id. at 331 (statement of Rep. Peters) (referring to past treaties 
abrogated by Congress). 
119. The Rush–Bagot Agreement that Lincoln had proposed terminating was originally 
concluded by President Monroe unilaterally based on his Commander in Chief authority, although 
it eventually received senatorial advice and consent.  See BRADLEY, supra note 27, at 90.  As a 
result, it may have been viewed as occupying an uncertain place between sole executive 
agreements (which indisputably can be terminated unilaterally by the President) and Article II 
treaties. 
120. TAFT, supra note 55, at 115–16. 
121. See, e.g., Memorandum from Herbert J. Hansell, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, to 
Cyrus R. Vance, U.S. Sec’y of State, President’s Power to Give Notice of Termination of U.S.–
ROC Mutual Defense Treaty (Dec. 15, 1978) [hereinafter Hansel Memorandum], in S. COMM. ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS, 95TH CONG., TERMINATION OF TREATIES: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
ALLOCATION OF POWER 395, 397 (Comm. Print 1978) (“In 1815, President Madison exchanged 
correspondence with the Netherlands which has been construed by the United States as 
establishing that the 1782 Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the two countries had been 
annulled.”). 
122. See CRANDALL, supra note 75, § 179, at 429 (“The state thus formed, although in 
general considered the successor to, differed in name, territory, and form of government from, the 
state which had entered into the treaty of October 8, 1782 with the United States.”). 
123. Id. 
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international law at that time, a treaty imposing reciprocal obligations 
became void if one of the parties ceased to exist—for example, if it was 
conquered by another nation.124  The United States, therefore, did not 
terminate this treaty. 
There is an even earlier episode that, although it did not involve any 
announced treaty termination, is sometimes cited in support of a unilateral 
presidential authority to suspend or terminate treaties.125  In 1793, there was 
a debate within George Washington’s cabinet over whether to receive an 
ambassador from revolutionary France with, or without, qualifications.126  
Receiving him without qualifications might signal that the United States 
accepted the continuing effect of the treaties it had with France, including a 
treaty of alliance, notwithstanding the changes in France’s government.127  
Receiving him with qualifications, by contrast, might allow the United 
States the option of suspending or terminating the treaties.128  Secretary of 
the Treasury Alexander Hamilton and Secretary of War Henry Knox 
thought the ambassador should be received with qualifications, whereas 
Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson and Attorney General Edmund 
Randolph thought he should be received without qualifications.129  The 
cabinet members prepared memoranda focused on whether international 
law allowed for suspension or termination of the treaties under these 
circumstances.130 
Ultimately, Washington decided to receive the ambassador without 
qualifications, so there was no effort to reserve the option of suspending or 
 
124. See, e.g., VATTEL, supra note 23, § 203 (noting that a treaty comes to an end “if, for any 
cause whatever, the Nation should lose its character as an independent political society”); see also 
HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 191 (London, Cary, Lea & Blanchard 
1836) (“Treaties . . . expire of course:—1. In case either of the contracting parties loses its 
existence as an independent State.”). 
125. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 30, at 324–26 (arguing that President Washington’s 
belief that he could renounce the treaties with France suggests that people during this period 
believed that the President had the power to terminate or suspend treaties); Yoo & Delahunty 
Memorandum, supra note 52, at 15–16 (citing Hamilton and Knox’s recommendation to 
Washington that he consider suspending the French treaty as evidence of a general understanding 
that the President had unilateral authority to suspend treaties). 
126. See generally WILLIAM R. CASTO, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE 
AGE OF FIGHTING SAIL 32–33 (2006) (describing the debate); STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC 
MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1788-1800, at 339–41 
(1993) (same). 
127. Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 32, at 667. 
128. Id. 
129. See id. at 667–68. 
130. See, e.g., Letter from Alexander Hamilton and Henry Knox to George Washington 
(May 2, 1793), in 14 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 367, 367–96 (Harold C. Syrett et al. 
eds., 1969) (arguing that the United States could choose to suspend or even renounce the treaties 
with France); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington (Apr. 28, 1793), in 25 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 607, 607–18 (John Catanzariti et al. eds., 1992) (arguing that the 
United States should not renounce the French treaties). 
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terminating the treaties.131  The cabinet members did not discuss in their 
memoranda whether it was proper as a matter of U.S. constitutional law for 
the President to suspend or terminate treaties unilaterally.  Their silence 
might suggest that they assumed that the President had this authority, 
especially since they decided not to call Congress into special session, but 
this is reading a lot into mere silence.132  In a related context, Alexander 
Hamilton did take the position that the President had the authority to 
suspend a treaty in response to a revolutionary change in the government of 
the other treaty party, but James Madison (whose views in this period were 
similar to Jefferson’s) sharply disputed Hamilton’s claim.133  In any event, 
the Executive Branch never made any public claim of a unilateral 
suspension or termination authority, so there was no opportunity to find out 
Congress’s views on the matter, and certainly no circumstance for crediting 
any sort of congressional acquiescence.  Finally, when the United States did 
take action five years later to terminate the French treaties, it did so, as 
noted above, by congressional resolution, not unilateral executive action.134 
The first instance in which a President actually proceeded to terminate 
treaty provisions without even after-the-fact congressional or senatorial 
approval appears to have been in 1899, when the McKinley Administration 
terminated certain clauses in an 1850 commercial treaty with 
Switzerland.135  McKinley did not terminate the entire treaty, and in fact 
some provisions in the treaty remain in effect even today.136  In addition, 
McKinley’s action need not be viewed as purely unilateral, given that he 
 
131. See Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 32, at 669. 
132. Cf. CURRIE, supra note 78, at 182 n.63 (noting that Washington’s decision “avoid[ed] 
the difficult constitutional question whether the President alone could terminate a treaty”). 
133. Compare Hamilton, supra note 39, at 42 (“Hence in the case stated, though treaties can 
only be made by the President and Senate, their activity may be continued or suspended by the 
President alone.”), with James Madison, “Helvidius” Number 3 (Sept. 7, 1793), reprinted in 15 
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 95, 99 (Thomas A. Mason et al. eds., 1985) (“Nor can [the 
President] have any more right to suspend the operation of a treaty in force as a law, than to 
suspend the operation of any other law.”).  More than two years earlier, Madison had suggested in 
a letter that the termination of a treaty in response to a breach by the other party required either 
congressional or senatorial approval.  See Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton 
(Jan. 2, 1791), in 13 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 342, 344 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 
1981) (stating that the Constitution requires that only the Legislature can terminate a “Treaty of 
peace” (emphasis omitted)). 
134. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
135. See Letter from John Hay, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Ambassador Leishman (Mar. 8, 1899), 
in PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 753, 753–54 (1901); 
see also Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Power of Congress and the President in International 
Relations: Three Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 643, 661 (1937) (observing 
that “there seems to be at least one instance where the President alone without cooperation of 
Senate or Congress has terminated certain treaty provisions, i.e., in the case of a treaty with 
Switzerland”). 
136. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 2012, at 266, 
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/202293.pdf. 
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was responding to a potential conflict between the treaty and a federal 
statute.  The Tariff Act of 1897 had authorized the President to negotiate 
reciprocal trade agreements,137 and, pursuant to the Act, the United States 
had concluded such an agreement with France.138  Switzerland contended 
that it was automatically entitled to the benefit of the concessions granted to 
France because of most-favored-nation provisions in the 1850 treaty.139  But 
granting it such concessions, without obtaining in return concessions 
similar to the ones given by the French, would have been contrary to 
longstanding U.S. trade policy, including the policy of Congress reflected in 
the Tariff Act.140 
E. Early Scholarly Commentary 
The only treaties that the United States terminated in the early years of 
its history were the French treaties, and that termination was related to the 
imminent state of hostilities between the two countries.  Moreover, early 
U.S. treaties did not contain clauses allowing for discretionary 
withdrawal,141 so that scenario likely would not have been considered.  
Perhaps for these reasons, constitutional law treatises in the early part of the 
nineteenth century have little if any discussion of treaty termination.  
Thomas Sergeant’s 1822 treatise on constitutional law did note, however, 
that “[i]t seems, the authority to declare a treaty to have been violated, and 
to be therefore void, belongs only to Congress; the judiciary cannot exercise 
it.”142  And William Rawle’s constitutional law treatise, published in 1825, 
tied a congressional power to terminate treaties to Congress’s power to 
declare war.143  Similarly, Joseph Story stated in his 1833 Commentaries on 
the Constitution that “it will not be disputed, that [treaties] are subject to the 
legislative power, and may be repealed, like other laws, at its pleasure.”144  
As discussed in the next Part, it appears that the first scholar to suggest  
a unilateral presidential authority to terminate treaties was Westel 
 
137. Tariff Act of July 24, 1897, ch. 11, § 3, 30 Stat. 151, 203 (repealed 1909). 
138. ADLER, supra note 75, at 165. 
139. Id. 
140. For the exchange of correspondence between Switzerland and the United States about 
this issue, see PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra 
note 135, at 740–57. 
141. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
142. THOMAS SERGEANT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 403 (Phila., Abraham Small 1822). 
143. See WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 68 (Phila., Philip H. Nicklin 2d ed. 1829) (“Congress alone possesses the right to 
declare war; and the right to qualify, alter, or annul a treaty being of a tendency to produce war, is 
an incident to the right of declaring war.”); see also WILLIAM ALEXANDER DUER, A COURSE OF 
LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 184 (N.Y.C., 
Harper & Bros. 1843) (“[T]he power in question may be regarded as an incident to that of 
declaring war.”). 
144. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 1832, at 695 (Bos., Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833). 
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Willoughby, a political science professor at Johns Hopkins, in his 1910 
treatise on U.S. constitutional law.145 
* * * 
Historical practice through at least the late nineteenth century suggests 
an understanding that congressional or senatorial approval was 
constitutionally required for the termination of U.S. treaties.  Not only was 
Congress or the Senate almost always involved in treaty terminations, but 
presidents generally acted as if they needed such involvement.  The chief 
debate was simply over whether the full Congress or merely the Senate 
should be involved in treaty terminations, and historical practice was 
viewed as relevant to that debate.  Lincoln’s initially unilateral action in 
1864 was potentially contrary to this understanding, but it was an outlier 
and generated constitutional criticism in Congress rather than acquiescence.  
Grant’s action in 1876 might have suggested some unilateral authority to 
suspend a treaty obligation, but this action was embedded within an 
acknowledgment of the need for congressional approval of termination.  It 
was not until McKinley’s action with respect to the Swiss treaty in 1899 
that there was anything resembling a clear precedent for a unilateral 
presidential termination authority, and that action involved only a partial 
termination and was arguably part of an effort to implement congressional 
policy.  Moreover, at least before the 1899 termination, the Executive 
Branch made no claim of a unilateral termination authority.  For example, 
in the digests of international practice prepared by the Executive Branch in 
the late nineteenth century, the materials quoted relating to treaty 
termination referred only to termination by Congress.146 
This historical account presents difficulties for scholars who have 
attempted to defend a presidential power over treaty termination on 
originalist grounds, such as under the Vesting Clause Thesis (which 
hypothesizes that the vesting clause of Article II of the Constitution 
implicitly conveys to the President authority not otherwise listed in 
Article II).147  There is no direct evidence that the Founders understood that 
the Constitution was granting the President a unilateral power of treaty 
termination.  Moreover, to the extent that originalists credit historical 
practice, they typically place much more emphasis on early practice than 
 
145. See infra subpart III(E). 
146. See, e.g., JOHN L. CADWALADER, DIGEST OF THE PUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE 
ATTORNEYS-GENERAL, AND OF THE LEADING DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS WITH 
REFERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, TREATIES, AND KINDRED SUBJECTS §§ 48–50, at 234 (rev. 
ed. 1877) (discussing the principles of treaty abrogation but making no mention of abrogation by 
the Executive Branch); 2 FRANCIS WHARTON, A DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 137(a), at 58–65 (2d ed. 1887) (same); see also David A. Schnitzer, Note, Into 
Justice Jackson’s Twilight: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis of Treaty Termination, 101 
GEO. L.J. 243, 265–66 (2012) (surveying period digests’ treatment of treaty abrogation). 
147. See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text. 
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modern practice, on the theory that it is closer in time to the founding and, 
thus, either is more likely to reflect founding intent or is a “liquidation” of 
issues unsettled at the founding.148  Yet the first century of U.S. practice 
weighs strongly against a unilateral presidential power of treaty 
termination.  If the Article II Vesting Clause conveyed to presidents the 
unilateral authority to terminate treaties, it is surprising that no one (with 
the possible exception of Alexander Hamilton) seemed to be aware of it for 
a hundred years. 
III. Twentieth-Century Shift to Presidential Unilateralism 
This Part describes the shift in U.S. practice during the twentieth 
century towards unilateral presidential termination of treaties.  The 
accretion of claims and practice relating to this issue occurred over a long 
period, running from Congress’s protectionist trade policy of the early 
twentieth century, to the U.S. rejection of the Versailles Treaty after World 
War I, to the onset of World War II and the related rise of the United States 
as a superpower.  Although there was significant controversy surrounding 
the issue in connection with President Carter’s announcement in 1978 that 
he was unilaterally terminating a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan, the 
Executive Branch prevailed in that dispute, and unilateral presidential 
termination of treaties has since become the norm.  In addition to 
considering publicly available materials such as congressional hearings, 
official correspondence, and presidential proclamations, the description in 
this Part takes account of a number of internal memoranda prepared by the 
legal office for the State Department during the first half of the twentieth 
century, which have been retrieved from the State Department archives.149 
A. Seeds of Change 
The stirrings of a shift to presidential unilateralism can be seen in the 
early years of the twentieth century.  In 1909, at the outset of the Taft 
Administration, the Solicitor for the State Department wrote an internal 
memorandum suggesting that it was constitutionally permissible for the 
President to act unilaterally in terminating a treaty.  The memorandum 
stated that, although presidential action pursuant to a congressional 
 
148. Some originalists accept that the Founders allowed certain unresolved constitutional 
issues to be worked out, or “liquidated,” by early practice and decisions.  See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, 
Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 547–53 (2003).  This 
liquidation idea was famously articulated by James Madison in The Federalist Papers.  See THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 225 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating that the 
meaning of the Constitution, like that of all laws, would be “liquidated and ascertained by a series 
of particular discussions and adjudications” (emphasis omitted)). 
149. Some of these memoranda have been partially excerpted in digests of practice published 
by the U.S. State Department.  See, e.g., HACKWORTH, supra note 75, § 509, at 319 (containing 
such an excerpt). 
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directive might be the “most effective and unquestionable method” for 
terminating a treaty, the President also had the option under U.S. law either 
of acting in conjunction with the Senate or through “notice given by the 
President upon his own initiative without either a resolution of the Senate or 
the joint resolution of the Congress.”150  In support of the last option, the 
memorandum noted that there had been one instance of unilateral 
presidential termination of a treaty, namely the 1899 termination of the 
provisions in the Swiss treaty.151  The memorandum concluded that the 
choice of which method to use for terminating a treaty “would seem to 
depend either upon the importance of the international question or upon the 
preference of the Executive.”152  As discussed above, two years later the 
Taft Administration moved to terminate a treaty with Russia as a result of 
Russia’s mistreatment of American Jews,153 and it seems likely that this 
memorandum was prepared in connection with the Administration’s initial 
consideration of that issue.154 
A few years later, the Supreme Court seemed to suggest in dicta that 
the Executive Branch could decide whether to stop complying with a 
bilateral treaty in response to a breach by the other party.  In Charlton v. 
Kelly,155 the Court concluded that it was not improper for the Executive 
Branch to extradite a U.S. citizen to Italy pursuant to an extradition treaty 
between the two countries, notwithstanding the fact that Italy had declined 
to extradite its own citizens to the United States.156  “The executive 
department having thus elected to waive any right to free itself from the 
obligation to deliver up its own citizens,” the Court reasoned, “it is the plain 
duty of this court to recognize the obligation to surrender the appellant as 
one imposed by the treaty as the supreme law of the land and as affording 
authority for the warrant of extradition.”157  It is not clear how much should 
be read into such dicta, but it is worth recalling that there was the 
 
150. Memorandum from James Brown Scott, Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of State, to President 
Wilson 1–2 (June 12, 1909) (on file with author). 
151. See id. at 2. 
152. Id. at 3. 
153. See supra text accompanying notes 113–18. 
154. The memorandum was prepared in June 1909.  The American Jewish Committee was in 
communication with the Administration about the Russian issue during this time period, and 
members of the Committee met with Taft during the summer of 1909.  See Naomi W. Cohen, The 
Abrogation of the Russo-American Treaty of 1832, 25 JEWISH SOC. STUD. 3, 9–10 (1963) 
(describing how Committee members Judge Sulzberger and Dr. Cyrus Adler met with Taft, the 
Secretary of State, and the American ambassador to Russia in the summer of 1909 and advocated 
for abrogation); Clifford L. Egan, Pressure Groups, the Department of State, and the Abrogation 
of the Russian–American Treaty of 1832, 115 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 328, 329–30 (1971) 
(describing Taft’s interaction with the American Jewish Committee in 1909 and 1910). 
155. 229 U.S. 447 (1913). 
156. Id. at 475–76. 
157. Id. at 476. 
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nineteenth-century precedent of President Grant in effect suspending 
extradition until an issue of treaty compliance could be worked out.158 
The topic of treaty termination arose again in 1919, during the debate 
in the Senate over whether to give its advice and consent to the Versailles 
Treaty, which, among other things, established the League of Nations.  The 
League of Nations Covenant had a provision allowing any member to 
withdraw after two years “provided that all its international obligations and 
all its obligations under this Covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time 
of its withdrawal.”159  Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, the Republican leader in 
the Senate and Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, proposed 
attaching a reservation to the Senate’s advice and consent providing that the 
United States could withdraw from the Covenant through enactment of a 
concurrent resolution by Congress.160  This proposal generated substantial 
discussion. 
Noting that a concurrent resolution does not require the agreement of 
the President, Senator Thomas moved to delete the concurrent resolution 
clause from the reservation on the ground that withdrawal from a treaty was 
“an executive and not a legislative function.”161  In the debate on the 
motion, Senator Jones asked “whether or not the President could give such 
notice [of termination] without authorization from Congress.”162  Senator 
Walsh replied, “I think not; clearly not.  I cannot believe that anybody could 
entertain any serious doubt as to that.”163  In arguing in favor of the 
concurrent resolution clause, however, Senator Spencer contended that the 
President could unilaterally withdraw the United States from the treaty and 
thus the concurrent resolution clause was simply adding another option for 
U.S. withdrawal.164  Numerous senators, however, either expressly 
disagreed with Spencer’s premise or expressed skepticism about it.165 
 
158. See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text. 
159. League of Nations Covenant art. 1, para. 3. 
160. 58 CONG. REC. 8074 (1919).  Lodge had significant concerns about the League of 
Nations Covenant, especially Article Ten, which involved a precommitment by the members to 
use military force in response to aggression.  He led a group of Republicans that insisted that the 
Senate include a package of reservations with its advice and consent to the Covenant.  Although 
there was majority support in the Senate for Lodge’s proposed approach, neither his proposal nor 
a Democratic proposal to have the Senate give its advice and consent without the reservations was 
able to garner the required two-thirds vote.  See JOHN MILTON COOPER, JR., BREAKING THE 
HEART OF THE WORLD: WOODROW WILSON AND THE FIGHT FOR THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 234–
375 (2001). 
161. 58 CONG. REC. 8074 (1919). 
162. Id. at 8076. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 8121–22. 
165. See, e.g., id. (Sen. Brandegee) (challenging Spencer’s premise that the President could 
withdraw the United States from the League of Nations unilaterally without the consent of 
Congress); id. at 8122 (Sen. Poindexter) (asking Spencer how the President can unilaterally repeal 
treaties if they are the supreme law of the land); id. (Sen. Thomas) (expressing skepticism of 
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In one of the more extensive analyses of the issue, Senator Robinson 
explained: 
While the authorities on the subject are somewhat confusing, and 
while the Senate precedents, as in almost every disputed case, are 
somewhat conflicting, I believe that I can successfully maintain that 
the proper, the constitutional, the customary method of giving such 
notice as is contemplated in the reservation is through some action 
which contemplates the concurrence of the Executive and the two 
Houses of Congress.166 
Robinson subsequently noted, however, that “[t]here may be cases . . . 
where the Executive alone[] has the authority to terminate a treaty, but these 
cases are exceptional.”167 
Nevertheless, the views on this question were mixed.  Senator Lenroot 
later pointed out that Westel Willoughby’s 1910 constitutional law treatise 
stated that the President had a unilateral withdrawal power.168  This seemed 
to cause Senator Walsh to retreat to some extent from his earlier statement 
to the contrary, while noting that he would “want to examine the question 
with very great care before [he] could accept any such doctrine [as argued 
by Willoughby].”169  Senator King then asked Senator Lenroot whether, if 
Willoughby were correct, there was any way that the Senate could protect 
itself against a President unilaterally terminating a treaty that the Senate had 
agreed to, and Lenroot responded that the courts would likely treat the 
matter as a political question, so the principal tool of Congress would 
probably be impeachment.170  Lenroot further noted, in response to another 
question from King, that the Senate could prospectively limit the 
President’s termination authority by including a provision to that effect in 
its advice and consent to a treaty.171  There was also some discussion of 
whether Taft’s termination in 1911 of the treaty with Russia was precedent 
for a unilateral termination authority, and Lenroot expressed the view that it 
was.172  Ultimately, the proposed amendment to the reservation was 
 
Spencer’s interpretation of the League of Nations article requiring “member” to be equivalent to 
“President” and that the President has unilateral authority to repeal treaties as supreme laws of the 
land under the treaty-making power); id. at 8124 (Sen. Robinson) (expressing doubt that the 
Executive Branch can terminate a treaty without involving Congress unless perhaps the treaty 
relates to functions exclusively within the Executive’s power). 
166. Id. at 8124. 
167. Id. at 8125. 
168. Id. at 8129, 8132. 
169. Id. at 8131; see also id. at 8130 (responding that he did “not undertake to say . . . whether 
the actual concurrence” of the President and Congress for withdrawal is “essential”). 
170. Id. at 8132. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
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rejected.  Shortly thereafter, the Senate voted against giving its advice and 
consent to the treaty even with the reservations.173 
The termination issue does not appear to have been settled.  In the next 
session of Congress, the Senate reconsidered its rejection of the treaty.174  
During that discussion, Senator Lodge moved to amend his proposed 
reservation to make clear that the United States could withdraw either by 
two houses of Congress or by presidential action.175  Lodge explained that 
the usual method of terminating treaties had been pursuant to congressional 
direction or concurrence, but he noted that there were two instances in 
which presidents had acted unilaterally—McKinley in 1889 and Taft in 
1911.176  When asked whether the President would have the authority to 
withdraw the United States from the Versailles Treaty even if this authority 
were not specified in the reservation, Lodge replied (somewhat awkwardly) 
that, “I think it is at least doubtful whether the President has not the power 
to do that.”177  The ensuing debate on his motion, however, concerned 
whether the Senate could delegate termination authority to the President, 
not whether he had such authority independently.178  In any event, Lodge’s 
amendment was rejected,179 and the original language of his proposed 
reservation was retained.180  The Senate then proceeded to reject the 
Versailles Treaty a second time.181 
Despite these various discussions of treaty termination, no President 
actually terminated a treaty unilaterally during the twentieth century until 
1927.  In that year, the Coolidge Administration withdrew the United States 
from a smuggling convention with Mexico without authorization or 
subsequent approval from Congress or the Senate.182  The administration 
explained that the United States had no commercial treaty with Mexico and 
that 
it is not deemed advisable to continue in effect an arrangement which 
might in certain contingencies bind the United States to cooperation 
for the enforcement of laws or decrees relating to the importation of 
commodities of all sorts into another country with which this 
 
173. See id. at 8803. 
174. 59 CONG. REC. 3229 (1920). 
175. Id. at 3229–30. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 3230. 
178. Id. at 3230–32. 
179. Id. at 3242. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 4599. 
182. ADLER, supra note 75, at 183–84. 
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Government has no arrangement, by treaty or otherwise, 
safeguarding American commerce against possible discrimination.183 
This action was taken after extensive concerns had been raised in Congress 
about Mexico’s confiscation of American property.184 
Unilateral presidential terminations subsequently became more 
common in the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, although some of 
these terminations, like McKinley’s 1899 termination of provisions in the 
Swiss treaty, were because of potential conflicts with trade legislation.  In 
1933, the Executive Branch withdrew the United States from a convention 
abolishing import and export restrictions, without authorization or 
subsequent approval from Congress or the Senate, because of (among other 
things) alleged conflicts between the convention and the new National 
Industrial Recovery Act.185  Also in 1933, Roosevelt unilaterally announced 
termination of an extradition treaty with Greece because of its purported 
breach of the treaty after Greece had refused to extradite Samuel Insull, a 
billionaire tycoon who was accused of financial misdealings.186  After 
Greece forced Insull to leave the country and a protocol to the extradition 
 
183. Telegram from Frank B. Kellogg, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Ambassador Sheffield (Mar. 
21, 1927), in 3 PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1927, at 
230, 230–31 (1942).  The Executive Branch has sometimes claimed that President Wilson 
unilaterally terminated a treaty with Belgium in 1920, but this is incorrect.  Pursuant to Congress’s 
directive in the Seaman’s Act, see supra note 93 and accompanying text, Wilson had given notice 
to Belgium in 1916 that the United States was terminating certain provisions in a treaty 
concerning the Congo.  See Letter from Robert Lansing, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Baron Beyens, 
Belg. Minister of Foreign Affairs (Nov. 11, 1916), in PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 34, 34–35 (1925) (notifying the Government of Belgium that 
pursuant to an Act of Congress, the United States government was terminating certain portions of 
a previously-agreed-upon treaty).  Belgium responded by saying that it preferred simply to 
terminate the entire treaty, and it asked the United States to formally acknowledge this 
denunciation.  Letter from Baron Beyens, Belg. Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Robert Lansing, 
U.S. Sec’y of State (Dec. 31, 1916), in PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE 
UNITED STATES, supra, at 35, 36.  Eventually, in 1920, the United States “acknowledge[d]” 
Belgium’s notice of termination. Letter from Norman H. Davis, U.S. Undersecretary of State, to 
Brand Whitlock, U.S. Ambassador to Belg. (Nov. 19, 1920), in 1 PAPERS RELATING TO THE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1920, at 207, 207–09 (1935).  Noting that the treaty 
did not contain any clause specifying the amount of notice required for withdrawal, the United 
States said that it would assume that the Belgian government wished the treaty to have terminated 
one year from the time of its notice of termination, since that was a customary period of notice.  
Id. at 209.  The treaty was therefore terminated by Belgium, not the United States, and the U.S. 
action that prompted Belgium to terminate the treaty was directed by Congress. 
184. See, e.g., 68 CONG. REC. 4591 (1927) (presenting a letter from an unknown source in 
Mexico explaining the theft of American property by a newly radical Mexican government). 
185. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Withdrawal of United States from International 
Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions (July 5, 
1933), reprinted in DEP’T OF STATE, PRESS RELEASES, JULY 1–DECEMBER 30, 1933 18, 18; see 
also 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1933, at 783–86 
(1950) (collecting telegram exchanges between U.S. officials that document the considerations 
surrounding the decision to withdraw from the convention). 
186. See 2 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1933, at 552–
69 (1949) (collecting telegram exchanges between U.S. officials that document the Insull affair). 
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treaty was subsequently negotiated, however, Roosevelt withdrew the 
notice.187 
In 1936, the Executive Branch withdrew the United States from a 
commercial treaty with Italy.188  The State Department wrote a 
memorandum advising President Roosevelt that this unilateral action was 
constitutional.189  While acknowledging that “[t]he question as to the 
authority of the Executive to terminate treaties independently of the 
Congress or of the Senate is in a somewhat confused state,” the 
memorandum maintained that “[n]o settled rule or procedure has been 
followed.”190  It also noted that there was a potential conflict between the 
treaty with Italy and a 1934 trade statute and that, if the treaty were not 
terminated, the President could “be placed in the position of having to 
choose between the execution of the act and observance of the treaty.”191  
The memorandum observed that this situation was “closely analogous” to 
the termination of provisions in the Swiss treaty in 1899, and it said that the 
1899 “precedent” was confirmed by the U.S. withdrawal from the import–
export treaty in 1933.192   
B. Establishing a Pattern 
Because many of the early-twentieth-century presidential terminations 
were based on potential conflicts with statutes, these actions would not 
necessarily have been understood as fully unilateral in nature.  By the late 
1930s, however, the Executive Branch was increasingly asserting a purely 
unilateral authority.  In 1939, the Roosevelt Administration announced that 
the United States was terminating a commercial treaty with Japan, after 
resolutions had been introduced in both houses of Congress supporting 
withdrawal.193  In connection with this decision, the State Department 
argued that the President had unilateral termination authority, this time 
relying on the “general spirit” of the Supreme Court’s 1936 decision in 
 
187. See ADLER, supra note 75, at 184–85. 
188. See 2 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1936, at 356–
59 (1954) (collecting exchanges between U.S. officials that document this withdrawal). 
189. Memorandum from R. Walton Moore, Acting U.S. Sec’y of State, to President Roosevelt 
5 (Nov. 9, 1936) (on file with author). 
190. Id. at 2–3. 
191. Id. at 3–4. 
192. Id. at 4–5.  The State Department Legal Adviser had prepared a memorandum earlier that 
year on abrogation of treaties.  That memorandum contends that, regardless of whether the 
President has a general power to terminate treaties unilaterally, it seems “that little doubt could 
arise when, as in the case of the Seaman’s Act, he is called upon to terminate provisions of treaties 
inconsistent with an Act of Congress and when failure to do so would place this Government in 
the position of failing to observe its treaty obligations.”  HACKWORTH, supra note 75, at 327–28 
(citing the Legal Adviser’s memorandum). 
193. H.R. Res. 264, 76th Cong. (1939); S. Res. 166, 76th Cong. (1939); Letter from Cordell 
Hull, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Ambassador Horinouchi (July 26, 1939), in 3 FOREIGN RELATIONS 
OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1939, at 558, 558–59 (1955). 
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United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,194 which had referred to the 
“delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of 
the federal government in the field of international relations.”195  The State 
Department reasoned that “the power to denounce a treaty inheres in the 
President of the United States in his capacity as Chief Executive of a 
sovereign state,” and it further contended that the President had “full control 
over the foreign relations of the nation, except as specifically limited by the 
Constitution.”196 
The 1930s also saw a political transformation in the United States, 
with Roosevelt having landslide victories in the presidential elections of 
1932 and 1936 and the Democrats coming to dominate both houses of 
Congress.197  In addition, the national security environment was changing 
significantly in this period, with increasing aggression by Adolf Hitler in 
Germany, the invasion of China by Japan, and eventually the start of World 
War II.  This environment was conducive to broader claims of executive 
authority.  A year after Curtiss-Wright, the Supreme Court decided United 
States v. Belmont,198 in which it held that a sole executive agreement 
entered into by President Roosevelt as part of his recognition of the Soviet 
Union preempted state law.199  Shortly thereafter, the Court began giving 
absolute deference to Executive Branch determinations relating to foreign 
sovereign immunity.200 
National security soon became directly relevant to the issue of treaty 
termination and suspension.  In 1939, for example, President Roosevelt 
suspended the London Naval Treaty (which limited naval armaments) 
because of the changed circumstances created by the war in Europe.201  Two 
 
194. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
195. Id. at 320.  The Court in Curtiss-Wright, in an opinion authored by Justice Sutherland, 
upheld a delegation of authority from Congress to the President to criminalize arms sales to 
countries involved in a conflict in Latin America.  Id. at 329–33. 
196. HACKWORTH, supra note 75, at 331–32 (excerpting from a State Department 
memorandum). 
197. 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 286, 311 (1998). 
198. 301 U.S. 324 (1937). 
199. Id. at 327.  The opinion in Belmont, like the opinion in Curtiss-Wright, was authored by 
Justice Sutherland.  Id. at 325; supra note 195. 
200. See Republic of Mex. v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35–36 (1945) (deferring to the State 
Department in deciding foreign-government immunity); Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 
586–87 (1943) (holding that a ship owned by Peru, seized in the course of private litigation, 
should be released because the State Department declared Peru immune from suit); Compania 
Espanola de Navegacion Maritima v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 74 (1938) (deferring to the 
Executive Branch in determining whether foreign governments are immune from suit); see also 
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 110–26 (Mariner Books 2004) (1973) 
(describing Roosevelt’s increasingly aggressive approach to the exercise of foreign-affairs 
authority); G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign 
Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1, 8 (1999) (referring to “the triumph of executive discretion in the 
constitutional regime of foreign relations between 1933 and the close of the Second World War”). 
201. See Armament Reduction, 1 DEP’T ST. BULL. 354, 354 (1939). 
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years later, he suspended, for the duration of the war, the International Load 
Lines Convention (which regulated ocean shipping) after his Attorney 
General, Francis Biddle, advised him that “[t]he convention may be 
declared inoperative or suspended by the President.”202  Biddle also noted, 
however, that, since “[i]t is not proposed that the United States denounce 
the convention under [the unilateral withdrawal clause in the treaty], nor 
that it be otherwise abrogated. . . .  [A]ction by the Senate or by the 
Congress is not required.”203  The opinion thus seemed to suggest that a full 
termination of a treaty, as opposed to a suspension, would require 
legislative action.  Nevertheless, the Roosevelt Administration terminated 
another treaty unilaterally in 1944—a protocol relating to a Latin American 
trademark treaty—citing the treaty’s general ineffectiveness.204 
The 1950s saw several additional unilateral presidential terminations, 
usually in low-profile situations that did not generate much attention, such 
as the Truman Administration’s withdrawal of the United States from a 
whaling convention205 and the Eisenhower Administration’s termination of 
both a Convention on Uniformity of Nomenclature for the Classification of 
Merchandise and a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with 
El Salvador.206  Although not solely a U.S. termination, the Eisenhower 
Administration also entered into a sole executive agreement in 1958 with 
Morocco to end a treaty relating to the management of a lighthouse in that 
country.207 
A 1958 memorandum from the State Department’s Deputy Assistant 
Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs, William Whittington, noted that, although 
“matters of policy or special circumstances may make it appear to be 
advisable or necessary to obtain the concurrence or support of the Congress 
or the Senate,” in practice treaties have been terminated in a variety of 
ways, including through unilateral presidential action.208  The memorandum 
also asserted that, at least for a self-executing treaty containing a unilateral 
withdrawal clause, “it is now generally considered that . . . it is proper for 
the Executive acting alone to take the action necessary to terminate or 
denounce the treaty.”209  Attached to the memorandum were appendices 
 
202. Int’l Load Line Convention, 40 Op. Att’y Gen. 119, 123 (1941). 
203. Id. 
204. Treaty Information, 11 DEP’T ST. BULL. 442, 442 (1944). 
205. Treaty Termination: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong. 83 
(1979) [hereinafter Treaty Termination Hearings]. 
206. See Treaty Information, 32 DEP’T ST. BULL. 906, 906 (1955) (noting the withdrawal 
from the nomenclature convention); Treaty Information, 38 DEP’T ST. BULL. 238, 238 (1958) 
(noting the termination of the treaty with El Salvador). 
207. Cape Spartel Light: Transfer of Management to Morocco; Termination of Convention of 
May 31, 1865, Mar. 31, 1958, 9 U.S.T. 527, 532. 
208. See Whittington Memorandum, supra note 25, at 5–6. 
209. Id. at 5. 
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listing the various treaty terminations in U.S. history and how they were 
carried out.210 
The practice of unilateral terminations continued during the 1960s.  In 
1962, the Kennedy Administration terminated a commercial treaty with 
Cuba as part of the United States’ embargo policy following the Cuban 
revolution.211  In 1965, the Johnson Administration gave notice that the 
United States was withdrawing from the Warsaw Convention that governs 
liability for international air carriers,212 but retracted the withdrawal shortly 
before the notice period expired.213 
There were still occasions in this period, however, in which the United 
States terminated treaties pursuant to congressional directive.  In 1951, for 
example, President Truman terminated commercial treaties with the Soviet 
Union and various Eastern European countries pursuant to a directive in the 
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951.214  In 1976, the Ford 
Administration withdrew the United States from several treaties relating to 
fishing pursuant to a directive in the 1976 Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act.215 
C. Termination of the Taiwan Treaty 
During the 1970s, the United States began to pursue closer relations 
with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  As one of the conditions to a 
normalization of relations between the two countries, the PRC insisted that 
the United States terminate its 1954 mutual defense treaty with Taiwan.  
Anticipating a change in Executive Branch policy concerning Taiwan, 
 
210. Id. at 7. 
211. See Convention for Commercial Relations with Cuba, U.S.-Cuba, Dec. 11, 1902, 33 Stat. 
2136 (establishing good commercial relations between the United States and Cuba); Proclamation 
No. 3447, Embargo on All Trade with Cuba, 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (Feb. 7, 1962), reprinted in 76 
Stat. 1446 (1962) (terminating commercial relations with Cuba). 
212. See Treaty Information, 53 DEP’T ST. BULL. 923, 924 (1965) (relating the United States’ 
denunciation of the Warsaw Convention and its attempt to negotiate revised terms). 
213. See Press Release, Dep’t of State, United States Government Action Concerning the 
Warsaw Convention (May 5, 1966), reprinted in The Warsaw Convention—Recent Developments 
and the Withdrawal of the United States Denunciation, 32 J. AIR L. & COM. 243, 245–46 (1966) 
(discussing the United States’ notification of termination and its subsequent withdrawal of that 
notice).  For commentary suggesting that the proposed unilateral withdrawal would have been 
unconstitutional, see John H. Riggs, Jr., Termination of Treaties by the Executive Without 
Congressional Approval: The Case of the Warsaw Convention, 32 J. AIR L. & COM. 526, 527–28 
(1966), and Comment, Presidential Amendment and Termination of Treaties: The Case of the 
Warsaw Convention, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 580, 581–82 (1967). 
214. See Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, ch. 141, 65 Stat. 72 (codified as amended 
at 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (2012)) (giving the President authority to take action in order to bring trade 
agreements “into conformity” with the Act); Proclamation No. 2949, 3 C.F.R. § 134 (1949–1953), 
reprinted in 65 Stat. c44 (1951). 
215. See Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, § 202(b), 
90 Stat. 331, 340–41 (giving the Executive Branch power to renegotiate international fishing 
treaties). 
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Congress in 1978 enacted (and the President signed) the International 
Security Assistance Act, which, among other things, expressed “the sense 
of the Congress that there should be prior consultation between the 
Congress and the executive branch on any proposed policy changes 
affecting the continuation in force of the Mutual Defense Treaty [with 
Taiwan] of 1954.”216  In December 1978, President Carter announced that 
the United States would recognize the PRC as the sole government of China 
and would terminate the Taiwan treaty pursuant to the unilateral withdrawal 
clause in the treaty (which required one year’s notice).217 
In a memorandum advising the President that he had the constitutional 
authority to terminate the treaty, the State Department Legal Adviser relied 
heavily on historical practice.218  The memorandum cited twelve instances 
in which presidents had purportedly terminated treaties unilaterally, and it 
included an extensive appendix entitled “History of Treaty Terminations by 
the United States.”219  The memorandum concluded that “[w]hile treaty 
termination may be and sometimes has been undertaken by the President 
following Congressional or Senate action, such action is not legally 
necessary.”220 
Carter’s action prompted substantial debate in the Senate.  Several 
resolutions were introduced in early January 1979, including a resolution 
sponsored by Senator Harry Byrd, Jr., that provided that it was “the sense of 
the Senate that approval of the U.S. Senate is required to terminate any 
mutual defense treaty between the United States and another nation.”221  
The Foreign Relations Committee held three days of hearings on this 
 
216. International Security Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-384, § 26(b), 92 Stat. 730, 
746; see also Jimmy Carter, International Security Assistance Act of 1978: Statement on Signing 
S. 3075 into Law (Sept. 26, 1978), in 2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES: JIMMY CARTER, 1978, at 1636, 1636 (1978) [hereinafter PUBLIC PAPERS OF JIMMY 
CARTER]. 
217. See President Jimmy Carter, Address to the Nation: Diplomatic Relations Between the 
United States and the People’s Republic of China (Dec. 15, 1978), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF JIMMY 
CARTER, supra note 216, at 2264, 2264–65 (recognizing the PRC as the sole government of China 
and announcing his intention to maintain relations with Taiwan “through nongovernmental 
means”). 
218. See Hansell Memorandum, supra note 121, at 397–99 (listing past presidential treaty 
terminations).  For criticism of the State Department’s description of the historical practice, see, 
for example, J. Terry Emerson, The Legislative Role in Treaty Abrogation, 5 J. LEGIS. 46, 77–78 
(1978); David J. Scheffer, Comment, The Law of Treaty Termination as Applied to the United 
States De-Recognition of the Republic of China, 19 HARV. INT’L L.J. 931, 979 (1978); and 
Jonathan York Thomas, Article, The Abuse of History: A Refutation of the State Department 
Analysis of Alleged Instances of Independent Presidential Treaty Termination, 6 YALE STUD. 
WORLD PUB. ORD. 27, 30 (1979). 
219. Hansell Memorandum, supra note 121, at 397–98, 400. 
220. Id. at 395. 
221. S. Res. 15, 96th Cong., 125 CONG. REC. 475 (1979). 
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resolution.222  The hearings included testimony and prepared statements 
from a variety of witnesses, including a number of scholars.  Scholars such 
as Arthur Bestor, Thomas Franck, and Michael Reisman testified or 
submitted statements in favor of senatorial or congressional participation in 
treaty termination.223  Other scholars, such as Abram Chayes, Andreas 
Lowenfeld, and John Norton Moore, testified in favor of a unilateral 
presidential power of termination.224 
The Foreign Relations Committee rejected the approach of the Byrd 
Resolution and reported out instead a resolution that would have recognized 
fourteen grounds for justifying unilateral presidential action to terminate 
treaty obligations, including the existence of a termination clause.225  After 
it reached the Senate floor, however, the Senate (on a vote of 59–35) 
substituted for its consideration the original Byrd Resolution, after Byrd’s 
motion for substitution was supported by a number of Senators who 
expressed the view that the President should not have unilateral power over 
treaty termination.226  But the Senate never actually voted on this 
resolution.227 
In the meantime, former Senator Barry Goldwater, along with a group 
of eight current senators and sixteen current members of the House of 
Representatives, filed a lawsuit in the federal district court in D.C. seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the termination of the Taiwan 
treaty.228  The district court initially dismissed the suit without prejudice, 
reasoning that the legislators would not have standing until there was action 
taken on the resolutions pending in the Senate.229  After the substitution of 
the Byrd Resolution in the Senate, the plaintiffs argued that they now had 
standing, and the court agreed, noting that the action on the Resolution was 
“evidence [of] at least some congressional determination to participate in 
the process whereby a mutual defense treaty is terminated, and clearly falls 
short of approving the President’s termination effort.”230  The court 
proceeded to reach the merits and concluded that “the President’s notice of 
termination must receive the approval of two-thirds of the United States 
Senate or a majority of both houses of Congress for it to be effective under 
 
222. Treaty Termination Hearings, supra note 205, at iii (indicating that the hearings were 
held from April 9 to 11, 1979). 
223. Id. at 25–32, 223–74, 387–96. 
224. Id. at 306–12, 396–425, 426–43. 
225. 125 CONG. REC. 13,685 (1979).  For the discussion in the Senate of this issue, see id. at 
13,672–710. 
226. Id. at 13,695–96. 
227. Id. at 13,710. 
228. Goldwater v. Carter, No. 78-2412, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11893, at *1 (D.D.C. June 6, 
1979). 
229. Id. at *16–17. 
230. Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 954 (D.D.C. 1979). 
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our Constitution to terminate the [Taiwan treaty].”231  In addition to textual 
and structural considerations, the court relied on historical practice, 
reasoning that “[t]he predominate United States’ practice in terminating 
treaties, including those containing notice provisions, has involved mutual 
action by the executive and legislative branches.”232 
The D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that President Carter’s termination 
of the treaty was constitutional.233  In addition to emphasizing the 
President’s role as “sole organ” in foreign relations, the court noted that the 
historical practice was varied and that there was no past instance in which 
“a treaty [has] been continued in force over the opposition of the 
President.”234  The court also emphasized that Carter had acted pursuant to a 
unilateral withdrawal clause in the treaty and reasoned that “the President’s 
authority . . . is at its zenith when the Senate has consented to a treaty that 
expressly provides for termination on one year’s notice, and the President’s 
action is the giving of notice of termination.”235  In other words, the court 
was claiming that Carter was acting within the highest category of 
presidential authority laid out by Justice Jackson in his concurrence in 
Youngstown.236 
Judge MacKinnon issued a lengthy dissent, focused especially on the 
history of treaty terminations.  He contended that “[c]ongressional 
participation in termination has been the overwhelming historical 
practice.”237  As for the instances of unilateral presidential termination, 
MacKinnon reasoned: 
It is almost farcical for appellant to contend that the President, acting 
alone, has absolute power to terminate a major United States defense 
treaty, and by the same token hereafter any defense treaty, because a 
few earlier Presidents withdrew financial support of a treaty bureau 
because of non-filing of trademarks by El Salvador, Honduras, 
Paraguay, et al., and terminated several violated treaties, or 
terminated treaties relating to a light house museum in Morocco, 
nomenclature in economic reports, smuggling with a country with 
 
231. Id. at 965. 
232. Id. at 960–64. 
233. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam). 
234. Id. at 706–07. 
235. Id. at 708. 
236. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (“When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of 
Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus 
all that Congress can delegate.”). 
237. Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 723 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). 
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whom we had no commercial treaty, or with respect to which notices 
of termination had been given and then withdrawn.238 
MacKinnon also argued that the majority’s suggestion that the treaty itself 
authorized Carter to engage in unilateral termination was a “deceptive 
misstatement” since “the President is not named in the Treaty to give notice 
of termination” and “[t]he sole issue in this case is who can act for the 
United States; that issue is not determined by the Treaty but by the 
Constitution of the United States.”239 
Without hearing oral argument, the Supreme Court vacated the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case.240  
Four Justices reasoned that the case presented a nonjusticiable political 
question.241  Providing a fifth vote for nonjusticiability, Justice Powell 
reasoned that the case was not politically ripe, given that the Senate had 
never voted on a resolution to disapprove the termination.  “If the Congress 
chooses not to confront the President,” said Powell, “it is not our task to do 
so.”242  The controversy effectively ended with this dismissal.243 
D. Subsequent Treaty Terminations 
In the years since the controversy over the termination of the Taiwan 
treaty, the United States has terminated dozens of treaties, and almost all of 
these terminations have been accomplished by unilateral presidential action.  
To take one example, the Reagan Administration gave notice in 1985 of its 
termination of a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with 
Nicaragua, and the treaty terminated the following year.244  In 2002, the 
 
238. Id. at 733–34 (emphasis omitted).  For additional criticism of the D.C. Circuit’s 
reasoning, see generally Raoul Berger, The President’s Unilateral Termination of the Taiwan 
Treaty, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 577 (1980). 
239. Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 737 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). 
240. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 996 (1979). 
241. Id. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J, concurring) (opinion joined by Justices Stewart and Stevens 
and Chief Justice Burger). 
242. Id. at 998 (Powell, J., concurring).  Justice Brennan reasoned that the termination was 
lawful because it was “a necessary incident” to President Carter’s recognition of mainland China, 
which fell within his constitutional authority.  Id. at 1007 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Justices 
Blackmun and White wanted to hold oral argument before making a decision.  Id. at 1006 
(Blackmun & White, JJ., dissenting in part). 
243. For additional discussion of the termination controversy, see generally VICTORIA MARIE 
KRAFT, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN POLICY: TERMINATING THE TAIWAN TREATY 
(1991).  In the mid-1980s, Goldwater introduced a resolution that would have provided that it was 
the sense of the Senate that, unless otherwise provided in a treaty, termination required either the 
advice and consent of the Senate or congressional approval.  S. Res. 40, 99th Cong., 131 CONG. 
REC. 678 (1985).  But the Senate never voted on the resolution.  See id. at 679–80. 
244. Economic Sanctions Against Nicaragua, 85 DEP’T ST. BULL. 74, 74–75 (1985).  A 
federal district court subsequently applied the political question doctrine to dismiss a challenge to 
this termination.  See Beacon Prods. Corp. v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191, 1198–99 (D. Mass. 
1986) (“[A] challenge to the President’s power vis-a-vis treaty termination raise[s] a 
nonjusticiable political question.”).  Not all the terminations were unilateral.  In 1986, Congress 
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State Department Legal Adviser’s Office listed twenty-three bilateral 
treaties and seven multilateral treaties that had been terminated by 
presidential action since termination of the Taiwan treaty.245  Since then, the 
Bush Administration terminated two treaties: a protocol to a consular 
convention in 2005246 and a tax treaty with Sweden in 2007.247 
Most of these terminations do not appear to have generated 
controversy.  An exception is President George W. Bush’s announcement in 
2002 that he was withdrawing the United States from the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile (ABM) Treaty with Russia.  In an Op-Ed article, the prominent 
constitutional law scholar Bruce Ackerman contended that Bush was acting 
unconstitutionally and asked rhetorically, “If President Bush is allowed to 
terminate the ABM treaty, what is to stop future presidents from 
unilaterally taking America out of NATO or the United Nations?”248  As 
noted earlier, thirty-two members of Congress brought suit challenging the 
constitutionality of the termination of the ABM Treaty, but the suit was 
dismissed for lack of standing and under the political question doctrine.249  
The Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) issued a 
memorandum concluding that the President had the authority to suspend or 
terminate the treaty.250  The memorandum relies on textual and structural 
 
directed President Reagan to terminate a tax treaty and an air services treaty with South Africa as 
part of the Anti-Apartheid Act (which was enacted over Reagan’s veto), and he did so.  See 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086, 1100, 1104 
(directing the President to terminate the treaties); Current Actions, 86 DEP’T ST. BULL. 84, 87 
(1986) (indicating that the treaties had been terminated). 
245. OFFICE OF LEGAL ADVISER, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2002 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES 
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2002, at 202–06 (Sally J. Cummins & David P. Stewart eds., 
2002). 
246. Frederic L. Kirgis, President Bush’s Determination Regarding Mexican Nationals and 
Consular Convention Rights, ASIL INSIGHTS add. (Mar. 2005), http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20120716203621/http://www.asil.org/insights050309a.cfm. 
247. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, United States Terminates Estate and Gift Tax 
Treaty with Sweden (June 15, 2007), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/hp463.aspx. 
248. Bruce Ackerman, Op-Ed., Treaties Don’t Belong to Presidents Alone, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 29, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/29/opinion/treaties-don-t-belong-to-presidents-
alone.html.  In a very partial description of the historical practice, Ackerman mentioned 
Congress’s 1798 termination of the French treaties and President Polk’s solicitation of 
congressional authorization to terminate the Oregon Territory Treaty in 1846, and then asserted 
that “[t]he big change occurred in 1978, when Jimmy Carter unilaterally terminated our mutual 
defense treaty with Taiwan.”  Id. 
249. Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2002).  Some members of the House of 
Representatives proposed a resolution that would have opposed termination of the ABM Treaty on 
policy grounds, but it did not take a position on the constitutionality of the termination, and the 
House never voted on it.  See H.R. Res. 313, 107th Cong. (2001) (asserting that termination of the 
ABM Treaty could, among other things, “be perceived by other nations as a threat” and “weaken 
ties with traditional allies”); see also 147 CONG. REC. 25,917 (2001) (introducing H.R. Res. 313 
but not voting on it). 
250. Yoo & Delahunty Memorandum, supra note 52, at 9.  OLC later disavowed this and 
another opinion relating to the suspension of treaty obligations, in part because it found 
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arguments such as the Vesting Clause Thesis and the President’s role as the 
“sole organ” in foreign relations, as well as on historical practice.251  
Invoking the historical gloss concept, the memorandum reasons that “[t]he 
executive branch has long held the view that the President has the 
constitutional authority to terminate treaties unilaterally, and the legislative 
branch seems for the most part to have acquiesced in it.”252  While 
acknowledging that Congress and the Senate have sometimes been involved 
in treaty terminations, the memorandum contends that “[t]hese examples 
represent the workings of practical politics, rather than acquiescence in a 
constitutional régime.”253  Despite complaints by select members of 
Congress, there was no formal effort by Congress as a body to oppose the 
termination of the ABM Treaty,254 and Congress ultimately approved 
funding for Bush’s missile defense plan.255 
E. Shift in Scholarly Commentary 
As late as the early twentieth century, most commentators took the 
position that the President needed either senatorial or congressional 
approval to terminate a treaty.  Charles Butler’s highly regarded treatise on 
the U.S. treaty-making power, published in 1902, noted that treaties could 
be abrogated “by Congressional action in several different methods” and 
did not seem to contemplate termination by unilateral presidential action.256  
Similarly, the prominent constitutional law scholar Edward Corwin, in his 
1917 book, The President’s Control of Foreign Relations, stated: “All in 
 
unconvincing the reasoning in the opinions suggesting that the President could suspend a treaty 
even when such suspension was not permissible under international law.  See Memorandum of 
Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., for the Files, Status of Certain OLC 
Opinions Issued in the Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, at 8–9 (Jan. 15, 
2009), available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/torturingdemocracy/documents/20090115.pdf 
(indicating that the two opinions should not be relied upon “to the extent they suggest[] that the 
President has unlimited authority to suspend a treaty beyond the circumstances traditionally 
recognized”).  OLC noted, however, that a 2007 opinion, which it was not disavowing, had 
observed that presidents have traditionally exercised the power to suspend treaties unilaterally 
“where suspension was authorized by the terms of the treaty or under recognized principles of 
international law.”  Id. at 9. 
251. Yoo & Delahunty Memorandum, supra note 52, at 3–5, 13. 
252. Id. at 9. 
253. Id. at 14. 
254. See DAVID M. ACKERMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21088, WITHDRAWAL FROM 
THE ABM TREATY: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 6 (2002) (noting that “the ABM Treaty has been 
terminated by President Bush in accordance with the terms of the treaty, and neither Congress nor 
the courts have acted to forestall or overturn that action”).  Senator Kyl spoke on the floor of the 
Senate in favor of President Bush’s authority to terminate the ABM Treaty.  See 148 CONG. REC. 
4536 (2002) (Sen. Kyl) (arguing that the text and structure of the Constitution, the intent of the 
Framers, and Supreme Court precedent all established executive authority to terminate treaties). 
255. See Paul Richter, Senate GOP Wins Funding Battle for Missile Defense, L.A. TIMES, 
June 27, 2002, http://articles.latimes.com/2002/jun/27/nation/na-missile27. 
256. 2 CHARLES HENRY BUTLER, THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 384, at 129 (1902). 
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all, it appears that legislative precedent, which moreover is generally 
supported by the attitude of the Executive, sanctions the proposition that the 
power of terminating the international compacts to which the United States 
is party belongs, as a prerogative of sovereignty, to Congress alone.”257 
Quincy Wright similarly supported legislative involvement in treaty 
termination in his important 1922 treatise on foreign relations law, although 
his discussion is somewhat more equivocal than Corwin’s, stating that the 
President “ought not to [terminate] without consent either of Congress or of 
the Senate, except in extraordinary circumstances.”258  Also writing in 1922 
(shortly before becoming Solicitor of the State Department), Charles 
Cheney Hyde noted in his treatise on international law that “[i]n behalf of 
the United States, notice of termination is given by the President, 
commonly in pursuance of a joint resolution of the Congress; and it has 
followed the unanimous resolution of the Senate.”259 
As noted earlier, an important exception to this early-twentieth-century 
consensus was the view of the constitutional law scholar Westel 
Willoughby, who stated without discussion in his 1910 constitutional law 
treatise that “[t]hough the Senate participates in the ratification of treaties, 
the President has the authority, without asking for senatorial advice and 
consent, to denounce an existing treaty and to declare it no longer binding 
upon the United States.”260  The second edition of Willoughby’s treatise, 
published in 1929, contains a much more extensive discussion of the issue 
of treaty termination, but it argues only that the President is not obligated to 
submit his treaty terminations to the full Congress and does not specifically 
address whether he must obtain the consent of the Senate.261 
In any event, by the 1920s there were additional commentators who 
defended a unilateral presidential authority to terminate treaties.  For 
example, John Mabry Mathews, in his 1922 treatise on foreign relations 
law, argued that  
 
257. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT’S CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 115 (1917). 
258. QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 260 (1922).  The 
year before, however, Wright had stated that “[p]ractice seems to sanction independent initial 
negotiation and denunciation of treaties by the President.”  Quincy Wright, The Control of 
Foreign Relations, 15 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 11 (1921) (emphasis added). 
259. 2 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND 
APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES § 539, at 80 (1922). 
260. 1 WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 223 (1910). 
261. See 1 WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 324, at 585 (2d ed. 1929) (“[T]here is no constitutional obligation upon the part of the 
Executive to submit his treaty denunciations to the Congress for its approval . . . .”).  On the issue 
of whether the President needed congressional approval, Willoughby expressly disagreed with 
Corwin.  See id. at 585 n.59 (stating that “[t]he author cannot, therefore, accept the conclusion of 
Corwin” that the power of treaty termination rests with Congress). 
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since the Senate has already, in its treaty-making capacity, acted 
upon a treaty providing for its termination upon notice, no further 
Senatorial action is necessary in effecting such termination, and that 
the President alone, as the mouthpiece of the nation in its 
international relations, may denounce the treaty by giving notice of 
its termination.262   
Similarly, Jesse Reeves (a political science professor at the University of 
Michigan) expressed the view in 1921 that “[i]t seems to be within the 
power of the President to terminate treaties by giving notice on his own 
motion without previous Congressional or Senatorial action.”263 
Nevertheless, scholarly views continued to be mixed, and there did not 
appear to be any settled understanding that the President possessed a 
unilateral power of termination.  Berkeley law professor Stefan Riesenfeld, 
writing in 1937, argued that  
[t]he most logical view is that the power to denounce a treaty is 
vested in the President by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, so that the department of the government which makes the 
treaty can terminate it, regardless of whether the termination is by 
unilateral, but lawful, denunciation or by a new treaty.264   
In his history of the Senate, published in 1938, George Haynes observed 
that there was uncertainty about whether the President could unilaterally 
terminate a treaty and that “[d]enunciation of treaties has usually been by 
joint resolution, originating sometimes in the House, sometimes in the 
Senate.”265 
By the 1940s, however, scholarly commentary was increasingly 
supportive of unilateral presidential authority.  For example, the second 
edition of Hyde’s treatise on international law (published in 1945 after 
Hyde had served as Solicitor for the State Department) added to what it had 
stated in 1922 as follows: 
The President is not believed, however, to lack authority to 
denounce, in pursuance of its terms, a treaty to which the United 
States is a party, without legislative approval.  In taking such action, 
he is merely exercising in behalf of the nation a privilege already 
conferred upon it by the agreement, and which involves no necessary 
modification thereof.  Denunciation in such case may be regarded as 
 
262. JOHN MABRY MATHEWS, THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 252 
(1922). 
263. Reeves, supra note 101, at 38. 
264. Riesenfeld, supra note 135, at 660. 
265. 2 GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY AND 
PRACTICE 670 (1938). 
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a mere normal incident in the conduct of foreign relations as they are 
confided to the Executive.266 
This was also a time of significant discussion of the President’s power to 
conclude executive agreements, and commentators who favored broad 
presidential authority to conclude such agreements also tended to favor 
unilateral presidential authority to terminate treaties.267 
There were additional scholarly endorsements of unilateral presidential 
termination authority in the 1950s and 1960s.268  The American Law 
Institute’s Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States, published in 1965, continued this trend.  It contended that the 
President had the authority to terminate a treaty pursuant to the terms of the 
treaty or based on the grounds for termination allowed under international 
law.269  The Restatement explained that this power stemmed from “the 
authority of the President to conduct the foreign relations of the United 
States as part of the executive power vested in him by Article II, Section 1 
of the Constitution.”270 
 
266. 2 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE: INTERNATIONAL LAW, CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND 
APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES § 539, at 1519–20 (2d rev. ed. 1945) (footnote omitted). 
267. See, e.g., WALLACE MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS: 
DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 306 (1941) 
(claiming that “[i]n treaty making[,] . . . negative action, not being feared by the constitution 
makers, was left to the repository of general executive power”); Myres S. McDougal & Asher 
Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable 
Instruments of National Policy: I, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 336–37 (1945) (asserting that termination of 
both executive agreements and treaties can be “effected by executive denunciation, with or 
without prior Congressional authorization”).  Many years later, in the context of President Carter’s 
termination of the Taiwan Treaty, McDougal appeared to have changed his mind.  See Treaty 
Termination Hearings, supra note 205, at 387, 391 (statement of Michael Reisman) (averring on 
behalf of himself and McDougal that “the constitutional system, if we are going back to this 
fundamental dynamic, seems to be based on a notion of sharing of power, rather than shifting it all 
to one branch”).  McDougal also joined an amicus brief in the Taiwan case on behalf of the 
plaintiffs, Brief of Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petition for Certiorari, Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (No. 79-856), and co-authored an 
article in the National Law Journal arguing against a unilateral presidential power of termination.  
See Michael Reisman & Myres S. McDougal, Who Can Terminate Mutual Defense Treaties?, 
NAT’L L.J., May 21, 1979, at 19, 19 (“[I]n the absence of material breach or rebus sic stantibus 
and, arguably, in the absence of an overwhelming external crisis to the body politic, the 
presumption must be that the president requires congressional authorization to terminate any 
agreement, other than a presidential agreement.”). 
268. See, e.g., 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES: THE POWERS OF GOVERNMENT § 215, at 132 (1963) (noting that the unilateral 
termination of a treaty by the President “appears justified by the constitutional position of the 
President as the nation’s sole organ of foreign intercourse”); Randall H. Nelson, The Termination 
of Treaties and Executive Agreements by the United States: Theory and Practice, 42 MINN. L. 
REV. 879, 887 (1958) (expounding that, because the “conduct of foreign relations” is a “plenary 
executive power” and no limitation is placed on treaty termination under the Constitution, the 
President has the power to unilaterally terminate treaties). 
269. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 163 (1965). 
270. Id. § 163 cmt. a. 
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In his influential foreign relations law treatise, published in 1972, 
Louis Henkin suggested that the answer to the constitutional question was 
unclear but that “since the President acts for the United States 
internationally he can effectively terminate or violate treaties, and the 
Senate has not established its authority to join or veto him.”271  He also 
noted that “[i]f issues as to who has power to terminate treaties arise 
again, . . . it seems unlikely that Congress will successfully assert the 
power.”272  Here, Henkin appears to have been making a political science 
observation as much as a legal observation: whatever one may think about 
the correct distribution of constitutional authority on this issue, Henkin was 
suggesting that the President’s assertion of unilateral authority was likely to 
prevail as a practical matter in congressional–executive relations.273  
Historical practice since 1972 tends to support this assessment. 
The controversy over President Carter’s termination of the Taiwan 
treaty revealed that the issue was still not settled, and, as noted, a number of 
scholars at that time took the position that congressional or senatorial 
approval was required for treaty termination.274  Since that termination, 
however, the controversy seems to have receded.  Like the earlier 
Restatement (Second), the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States, published in 1987, contends that the President has 
the authority to terminate a treaty as long as the treaty allows for unilateral 
withdrawal or there is an international-law ground for termination.275  A 
number of scholars, including some who do not always favor expansive 
readings of presidential authority, have agreed with this proposition.276  As 
a result, it is probably fair to describe this as the prevailing, although 
certainly not unanimous, view.277 
 
271. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 169 (1972). 
272. Id. at 170. 
273. See also FRANCIS D. WORMUTH & EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, TO CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR: 
THE WAR POWER OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW 194 (2d ed. 1989) (“[T]he President has 
demonstrated an effective power to terminate treaties, and the Senate has not successfully 
challenged that right to do so.”). 
274. See supra text accompanying note 223. 
275. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 339 (1987). 
276. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 153–55 (1990) 
(pronouncing the Restatement’s position “sound”); Jinks & Sloss, supra note 38, at 156 (agreeing 
with the functionalist rationale of presidential power to terminate treaties). 
277. In its comprehensive 2001 study on treaties, prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, the Congressional Research Service noted that “[t]he constitutional requirements that 
attend the termination of treaties remain a matter of some controversy,” and it described the issue 
of whether the President has a unilateral termination power to be “a live issue.”  CRS STUDY, 
supra note 42, at 198–99.  Nevertheless, it also noted that, “[a]s a practical matter . . . the 
President may exercise this power since the courts have held that they are conclusively bound by 
an executive determination with regard to whether a treaty is still in effect.”  Id. at 201; cf. 
H. Jefferson Powell, Essay, The President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch 
Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 562 (1999) (“Despite its obvious importance and the 
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IV. Implications for Law, Theory, and Politics 
This Part considers the implications of the historical practice of U.S. 
treaty terminations, both for the specific issue of whether the President has 
a unilateral termination authority and for the more general historical gloss 
method of constitutional interpretation.  It also reflects on the extent to 
which a practice-based account of institutional authority, such as the 
account given here, constitutes a description of constitutional law as 
opposed to a description of mere politics. 
A. Current Law of Treaty Termination 
As we have seen, as a matter of practice, presidents today exercise a 
unilateral power of treaty termination.  The precedent for this practice can 
be traced back to the end of the nineteenth century, and the practice has 
been especially robust since the 1930s.278  Moreover, with the important 
exception of the debate over the termination of the Taiwan Treaty, Congress 
has not seriously opposed exercises of this presidential authority.279  Even 
during the Taiwan Treaty debate, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
took the position that the President had the authority to terminate a treaty 
when, as was true there, termination was permissible under international 
law.  To be sure, a majority of the Senate appeared to disagree with the 
Committee, but it is also the case that the full Senate never voted on any 
resolution to contest the President’s authority. 
As discussed in Part I, most accounts of how historical practice can 
inform the separation of powers would require “acquiescence” by the 
affected branch of government.  There are a number of conceptual 
difficulties with this concept, however, especially as applied to Congress, 
and these difficulties argue for caution before treating mere inaction by 
Congress as acquiescence.280  Nevertheless, the congressional inaction 
surrounding the issue of treaty termination is noteworthy.  First, it has been 
longstanding, involving numerous congresses and presidential 
administrations, during times of both unified and divided government.  
With the exception of the debate over the termination of the Taiwan Treaty, 
there has been a century of congressional passivity in the face of 
presidential treaty terminations.  Second, Congress has failed to protest 
presidential terminations even with “soft law” measures such as one-house 
resolutions or statements by congressional leadership, even when 
presidential treaty terminations have received significant public attention 
(as they did, for example, in both the Taiwan termination debate and the 
 
substantial history surrounding the issue, the question of which political branch has the power to 
withdraw from or terminate treaties remains unsettled.”). 
278. See supra subpart III(B). 
279. See supra subpart III(C). 
280. See supra text accompanying notes 67–71. 
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debate over the termination of the ABM Treaty).  Third, even though it has 
approved numerous treaties containing withdrawal clauses, the Senate has 
failed to address the question of which U.S. actor can invoke these clauses, 
even though it could easily do so in its resolutions of advice and consent.281 
There are, in any event, reasons for crediting historical practice in the 
separation of powers area that do not turn on institutional acquiescence.282  
One such reason is the general desirability, for legitimacy and other 
reasons, of having an account of constitutional law that bears a reasonable 
resemblance to actual constitutional practice, both now and in the 
foreseeable future.283  In addition, if in fact government actors look to past 
practice to inform their own understanding of—and to shape their claims 
about—the law, legal philosophers working in the tradition of H.L.A. Hart 
would treat that second-order practice as itself a fundamental feature of the 
legal order.284  These considerations have particular salience for the issue of 
treaty termination.  Unilateral presidential termination of treaties is an 
established and longstanding practice, and it seems unlikely that Congress 
will do anything in the coming years to destabilize that practice.  Moreover, 
the courts have shown little inclination to resolve the issue, and the longer 
they wait the more entrenched the practice becomes.  As a result, an 
account of modern U.S. constitutional law that denied a presidential 
authority to terminate treaties (at least as a general matter) would face 
serious descriptive limitations.285 
 
281. Cf. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional 
Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 399–405 (2000) (discussing conditions imposed by the Senate 
in connection with its ratification of human rights treaties). 
282. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 456–60 (describing reasons for crediting 
historical practice concerning separation of powers). 
283. See id. at 456 (arguing that the legitimacy of a law is partially tied to actual behavior and 
practice related to it); cf. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 66 (1986) (“The justification need 
not fit every aspect or feature of the practice, but it must fit enough for the interpreter to be able to 
see himself as interpreting that practice, not inventing a new one.”); LON L. FULLER, THE 
MORALITY OF LAW 81 (rev. ed. 1969) (discussing the importance of “congruence between official 
action and the law”). 
284. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94–99 (3d ed. 2012) (discussing secondary 
“rules of recognition”); Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitution, in 
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 
145, 150 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (“The ultimate rule of recognition is a matter of social fact, 
and so determining it is for empirical investigation rather than legal analysis.”); see also 
Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma, Introduction to THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND 
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION xiii, xv (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009) (“[T]he 
U.S. rule of recognition may be substantially longer and more complicated than a simple reference 
to the 1787 Constitution (or the Amendment Clause thereof), in part because it may give 
independent effect to extraconstitutional sources of law, such as judicial precedent or official 
custom.”). 
285. Because the precise contours of constitutional custom are contestable, it is still possible 
to argue as a descriptive matter that certain types of treaties are not subject to unilateral 
presidential termination.  It might be argued, for example, that in light of Congress’s power to 
declare war, a president may not unilaterally terminate a peace treaty. 
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The absence of judicial review may itself be related to the 
longstanding nature of the practice.  In abstaining on this issue, courts may 
reasonably perceive that the durability of a practice over numerous 
presidential administrations is evidence that the practice is functionally 
desirable, or at least not too functionally problematic.286  It is easy to 
imagine that there are advantages to the United States of being able to make 
credible threats of exit from treaty regimes as part of negotiations to reform 
international institutions or induce better compliance by its treaty 
partners—advantages that could be facilitated by allowing for unilateral 
presidential action.287  Moreover, it is possible that ease of exit as a matter 
of U.S. constitutional procedure makes it easier to persuade the Senate to 
agree to such treaties in the first place.288  While such ease of exit could also 
in theory be destabilizing to foreign relations, it is not obvious from the 
historical record that there is any presidential tendency to devalue 
international commitments more than Congress. 
For all these reasons, the best description of the current U.S. 
constitutional law governing treaty termination is probably as described by 
the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law: the President has the 
unilateral authority to terminate treaties when such termination is permitted 
under international law and is not disallowed either by the Senate in its 
advice and consent to the treaty or by Congress in a statute.289  Unlike the 
Restatement (Third), however, which chiefly relies on a purported 
implication of the President’s role as the “sole organ” in foreign affairs,290 
the account presented here is grounded chiefly in the longstanding accretion 
of Executive Branch practice and claims in the face of congressional 
inaction and judicial abstention. 
Some scholars (and, for a time, the Executive Branch during the Bush 
Administration) have gone even further, suggesting that the President can 
 
286. Cf. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 329 (1936) (explaining, in 
declining to invalidate a congressional delegation of foreign-affairs authority to the President, that 
“[t]he uniform, long-continued and undisputed legislative practice” of making broad delegations 
to the President in foreign affairs “rests upon an admissible view of the Constitution which, even 
if the practice found far less support in principle than we think it does, we should not feel at 
liberty at this late day to disturb”). 
287. Cf. Matthew C. Waxman, The Constitutional Power to Threaten War, 123 YALE L.J. 
(forthcoming 2014) (arguing that, in thinking about the scope of the President’s war authority, it is 
important to consider the President’s ability to threaten war). 
288. Recall that an argument along these lines was made, albeit unsuccessfully, in an effort to 
broker a compromise on the Versailles Treaty.  See supra notes 159–61 and accompanying text. 
289. See supra note 275 and accompanying text. 
290. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 339 reporters’ note 1 (1987) (arguing that “[a] power so characterized would seem to include the 
authority to decide on behalf of the United States to terminate a treaty that no longer serves the 
national interest, or is out of date, or which has been breached by the other side” while also stating 
that the power to terminate treaties “is implied in [the President’s] office as it has developed over 
almost two centuries” (emphasis added)). 
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(like Congress) terminate or override a treaty’s domestic effect even when 
there is no basis in international law for terminating the treaty.291  That 
proposition is highly contested, however, and there is little historical 
practice in support of it.  Moreover, the unusual decision in 2009 by the 
Office of Legal Counsel to withdraw an earlier claim of this authority 
renders it even more suspect.292 
To say that the President has a unilateral authority to terminate treaties 
is not to say that this is an exclusive presidential power.  If it is merely a 
concurrent power shared with either the full Congress or the Senate, then 
either Congress or the Senate could potentially place limitations on it.  The 
termination authority, in other words, would fall within what Justice 
Jackson described in Youngstown as an intermediate “zone of twilight” in 
which the President and Congress might have overlapping authority.293  If 
Congress or the Senate took action to prohibit presidential termination—for 
example, if the Senate made senatorial approval of termination a condition 
of its advice and consent to the treaty—then a unilateral presidential 
termination in violation of such a condition would cause the President’s 
action to fall within what Jackson referred to as the “lowest ebb” of 
presidential authority.294 
During the debates over the termination of the Taiwan Treaty, the 
Executive Branch suggested that it viewed the presidential power of 
 
291. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 41, at 214 (arguing that when the President terminates a 
treaty, it ceases to exist in international and domestic law); John C. Yoo, Rejoinder, Treaties and 
Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
2218, 2242 (1999) (arguing that because the President, rather than Congress, has full 
policymaking control in treaty formation, the President may terminate a treaty unilaterally at will). 
292. See supra note 250.  This is an example of how international law might at least indirectly 
limit presidential authority: if international law causes a treaty to remain in force, then the U.S. 
Constitution may give the treaty a domestic-law status that cannot be terminated unilaterally by 
the President.  A slight potential counterexample occurred in 2005, when the Bush Administration 
purported to withdraw the United States from a protocol to a consular convention.  The 
Administration seemed to suggest that the withdrawal was effective immediately, whereas it was 
arguable that international law required a year’s notice.  See Kirgis, supra note 246 (discussing the 
legal ramifications of withdrawing from the consular convention).  For additional consideration of 
potential interactions between international law and the separation of powers, see Jean Galbraith, 
International Law and the Domestic Separation of Powers, 99 VA. L. REV. 987 (2013). 
293. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (“When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of 
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in 
which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.”); 
see also GLENNON, supra note 276, at 152 (arguing that “in the face of congressional silence, 
treaty termination by the President does not impinge upon the constitutional prerogatives of the 
Senate or Congress”). 
294. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 n.23 (2006) (“Whether or not the President has independent power, 
absent congressional authorization, to convene military commissions, he may not disregard 
limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his powers.”). 
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termination as exclusive.295  Importantly, though, the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee made clear during the debate that it did not accept that 
proposition, despite otherwise favoring robust presidential authority with 
respect to treaty terminations.296  Moreover, there is no significant historical 
practice to support the Executive Branch’s claim.  Perhaps for this reason, 
the Restatement (Third) contends that if the Senate gave its advice and 
consent to a treaty on the condition that any termination occur only with its 
consent, and the President proceeded to conclude the treaty, “he would be 
bound by the condition.”297  A number of scholars have expressed 
agreement with this proposition.298  In its 2001 study on treaties prepared 
for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Congressional Research 
Service correctly noted that “the assertion of an exclusive Presidential 
power in the context of a treaty is controversial and flies in the face of a 
substantial number of precedents in which the Senate or Congress have 
been participants.”299 
B. Constitutional Interpretation and Change 
The account given in subpart IV(A) of the current constitutional law of 
treaty termination has potential implications for theories of constitutional 
interpretation and change.  Under that account, a unilateral presidential 
termination authority does not exist today because of an assessment of 
founding intent or understanding.  Nor does it follow clearly from 
constitutional text or structure, or from judicial decisions, although those 
aspects of constitutional interpretation are of course relevant.  Rather, the 
President’s constitutional authority for this issue exists in part because some 
aspects of U.S. constitutional law are made by the participants in the 
 
295. See Treaty Termination Hearings, supra note 205, at 218 (statement of Larry A. 
Hammond, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel) (“[W]e do not believe that the 
Senate may expand that advice and consent power by attaching reservations with respect to 
termination.”). 
296. See S. REP. NO. 96-119, at 11 (1979) (expressing the view that it was “clear beyond 
question” that the Senate could validly limit the President’s authority to terminate a treaty by 
placing a condition on such termination in the Senate’s advice and consent to the treaty). 
297. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 339 reporters’ note 3 (1987). 
298. See, e.g., GLENNON, supra note 276, at 156 (arguing that the Constitution compels the 
President to follow any termination procedure prescribed by the Senate); Kristen E. Eichensehr, 
Treaty Termination and the Separation of Powers, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 247, 279–86 (2013) (arguing 
that “for cause” limitations imposed by the Senate on the President’s treaty-termination power are 
constitutional); see also Powell, supra note 277, at 563 (concluding, based largely on historical 
practice, that the power of treaty termination is not exclusive to the President).  Presumably, 
Congress could similarly limit presidential withdrawal from “congressional–executive 
agreements”—that is, international agreements approved or authorized by a majority of both 
houses of Congress rather than two-thirds of the Senate.  See Hathaway, supra note 27, at 1332–
33 (discussing possible limitations that Congress can place on the President in such agreements). 
299. CRS STUDY, supra note 42, at 199. 
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system over time.  Treaty termination is, in another words, an instance of 
what some scholars have termed “constitutional construction”—the fleshing 
out of constitutional meaning in ways that go beyond merely interpreting 
constitutional text.300 
The best description of this constitutional law today is also different 
from the description that most constitutional observers would have been 
given, say, in 1900.  Treaty termination thus provides a vivid illustration of 
how constitutional understandings can change even when the courts are not 
involved.  This change did not occur at one particular moment in time but 
rather developed over the course of decades.  While the dispute over 
President Carter’s termination of the Taiwan Treaty in the late 1970s was 
important in leading to a consolidation of presidential authority over this 
issue, that consolidation was facilitated by the accretion of claims and 
practice that had already occurred.  The dynamic described here thus differs 
from accounts of constitutional change that focus primarily on dramatic 
moments and episodes.301  There are reasons to believe, moreover, that 
something like this pattern of constitutional change can be identified for 
other issues as well, especially in the area of separation of powers.302 
 
300. See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 5 (2011) (noting that the actions of all three 
branches of government can contribute to constitutional construction); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 228 
(1999) (discussing constitutional construction, the realm in which “the Constitution adapts and 
evolves to accommodate and to cause external change”); see also STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG 
WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION (2013) (considering how modern war powers authority has been 
constitutionally constructed); Alan M. Wachman, Carter’s Constitutional Conundrum: An 
Examination of the President’s Unilateral Termination of a Treaty, 8 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 
427, 456 (1984) (contending that “a decision [about treaty termination authority] would be a 
constitutional construction of our own making, not one found in the document [of the 
Constitution]”).  For additional discussion of the concept of constitutional construction and the 
relationship of this concept to originalist theories of constitutional interpretation, see Lawrence B. 
Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2013) 
(discussing originalism and constitutional construction). 
301. See generally, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) 
(arguing that there are rare instances in American politics of “higher lawmaking” sufficient to 
change the Constitution despite the absence of a formal amendment); Eric A. Posner & Adrian 
Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991 (2008) (exploring the effect of 
“constitutional showdowns,” which involve interbranch confrontations that can produce precedent 
about the meaning of the Constitution). 
302. For preliminary case studies on war powers and congressional–executive agreements that 
describe somewhat comparable patterns, see Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 461–76.  See 
also Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 TEXAS L. REV. 
961, 1009 (2001) (arguing, in addressing the debate over the constitutionality of congressional–
executive agreements, that constitutional change can and does occur through “increments” rather 
than dramatic points in time); Peter J. Spiro, War Powers and the Sirens of Formalism, 68 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1338, 1355 (1993) (reviewing JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: 
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993)) (suggesting, in a 
consideration of the distribution of war authority between Congress and the President, that the 
relevant constitutional law stems from “an accretion of interactions among the branches” that 
“gives rise to basic norms governing the branches’ behavior in the area”). 
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Very likely the change in treaty-termination practice was driven in part 
by other changes—such as the increased role of the United States in the 
world—that were contributing to the enhancement of Executive authority 
across a wide range of issues.303  The growth in both treaty-making in 
general, and the increasingly widespread inclusion of unilateral withdrawal 
clauses in treaties, probably also were factors.  But lawyers, including 
lawyers within the State Department as well as legal scholars, also appear to 
have played an active role in assessing and influencing the relationship 
between the constitutional practice and constitutional understandings.304  
While not playing a direct role, the Supreme Court also may have helped 
facilitate the shift, through its increasingly deferential posture towards the 
Executive Branch starting in the 1930s.305 
That constitutional change occurs in the United States in this way does 
not necessarily mean, of course, that it is desirable.  The lack of modern 
resistance by Congress to presidential unilateralism on treaty termination 
could be for normatively attractive reasons, such as a recognition that the 
President is likely to have better information about the costs and benefits of 
such action and will have more negotiating power if he can make threats 
that are not dependent on legislative ratification.  But this lack of resistance 
could be for other reasons, such as a disinterest by members of Congress in 
issues that are unlikely to be of concern to constituents, a phenomenon that 
may apply to a broad range of foreign-affairs issues, including treaty 
termination.306  If so, crediting such inaction might produce socially 
undesirable outcomes. 
The accretion dynamic described here also implicates tradeoffs 
associated more generally with the idea of “common law 
constitutionalism,” an approach usually associated with judicial decision 
making but which in theory might also apply to constitutional reasoning by 
nonjudicial actors.307  On the one hand, having the law develop through the 
accretion of precedents can lead to path dependency and, relatedly, a lack of 
 
303. See supra notes 198–204 and accompanying text. 
304. See supra notes 146, 189, 192, 202, 208 and accompanying text. 
305. See supra text accompanying notes 198–200.  Although not explored here, the social 
science literature on “historical institutionalism” might offer additional insights for assessing this 
sort of change in institutional practice.  Recent scholarship in that area has focused on how 
institutions change, sometimes dramatically, through incremental shifts.  See generally, e.g., PAUL 
PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS (2004); KATHLEEN 
THELEN, HOW INSTITUTIONS EVOLVE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SKILLS IN GERMANY, 
BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES, AND JAPAN (2004). 
306. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 442 (describing the focus on reelection as a 
primary motivator for the actions of members of Congress). 
307. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 877, 925 (1996) [hereinafter Strauss, Constitutional Interpretation] (describing common law 
constitutionalism); see also DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 33–42, 46–49 (2010) 
(same). 
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concentrated deliberation.  On the other hand, it can also help ensure that 
the law is shaped to address specific, real-world contexts rather than 
abstract speculations about the future.  This benefit might have particular 
salience for foreign relations law issues, such as treaty termination, in light 
of the ever-changing nature of the international environment and the United 
States’ role within it.  The wide variety of situations that might trigger a 
decision to suspend or terminate treaty obligations, or to threaten to do so, 
also supports an inductive, evolutionary approach to the issue rather than 
one based on a general theory or abstract reasoning. 
Like any precedent-based approach, the historical gloss method of 
discerning the separation of powers also presents interpretive challenges.  
As an initial matter, there can be difficult questions about what counts as 
relevant practice.  For example, it might be unclear how to weight claims of 
authority made by institutional actors that are not carried out (such as treaty 
terminations that are threatened but then rescinded).  In addition, customary 
practice is not self-liquidating; it requires interpretation and description, 
which inevitably involves an element of judgment and subjectivity.308  Of 
course, the same is probably true of other sources of constitutional 
interpretation, but the lack of a canonical text may exacerbate the difficulty.  
Moreover, if the relevant law is tied to practice, then the law can potentially 
change over time, as in fact appears to have happened with respect to the 
authority over treaty termination.  Although this might be perceived as a 
virtue in that it allows the law to adapt to changing conditions, it might also 
pose challenges for stability and predictability in the law.309  Again, though, 
this is not a problem unique to this interpretive source; constitutional law 
can and does change, for example, through Supreme Court interpretations.  
At least with Supreme Court opinions, however, there is an understood 
public text that serves as a point of reference and potentially also as a stare 
decisis break on deviations. 
There is another potential problem that relates specifically to the 
reliance on historical practice in the area of separation of powers.  For a 
 
308. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Do Trade Customs Exist?, in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 118, 122 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. 
Walt eds., 2000) (“[A]ny history of prior decisions will always underdetermine the possible 
patterns that might be ascribed to that history.”); Martin S. Flaherty, Post-Originalism, 68 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1089, 1105 (2001) (reviewing DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE 
JEFFERSONIANS, 1801–1829 (2001)) (“As a theoretical matter, custom has its own problems.  Not 
least among these are the questions of what counts as the relevant custom, at what level of 
generality, and for how long.”).  But cf. Michael D. Ramsey, The Limits of Custom in 
Constitutional and International Law, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2249133 (distinguishing between applications 
of custom that do not involve contested value judgments and those that do). 
309. See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, The Status of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions in 
the United States, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1847, 1869 (noting that constitutional conventions “are 
under constant pressure of erosion”). 
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variety of reasons, the Executive Branch probably has a greater ability than 
Congress to generate both institutional practice and instances of 
nonacquiescence.310  If so, then there is an obvious danger that a practice-
based approach will favor Executive authority over the long term, which 
may contribute to an imbalance of authority between the branches.  Indeed, 
it is generally thought that presidential authority has expanded in the 
modern era relative to congressional authority.311  This phenomenon might 
be exacerbated by a tendency of Executive Branch lawyers to over-claim 
about past practice, something that appears to have been the case at various 
times with respect to the issue of treaty termination.312 
Many commentators have suggested that the solution to the potential 
imbalance between the ability of Congress and the President to take direct 
action is greater judicial review.313  It may well be that some additional 
amount of judicial review is needed in the separation of powers area, 
especially if judicial abstention is premised on the idea that Congress has 
sufficient capacity and incentives to sufficiently guard its institutional 
interests.314  At the same time, courts are themselves part of the separation 
of powers structure, and thus there is no guarantee that they will be less 
acquiescent than Congress when faced with Executive unilateralism.315  
 
310. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 439–45 (discussing structural impediments, 
political asymmetries, and issues of congressional–executive relations as explaining why Congress 
and the President “are not equally situated in their ability to take action”); see also Terry M. Moe 
& William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 
133–34 (1999) (describing a variety of ways in which presidents can take actions that have legal 
effect without the participation of Congress). 
311. See Richard H. Pildes, Law and the President, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1381 (2012) 
(reviewing ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE 
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010)) (“It is widely recognized that the expansion of presidential power 
from the start of the twentieth century onward has been among the central features of American 
political development.”). 
312. See supra notes 50–52, 218 and accompanying text. 
313. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 302, at 54 (discussing how the courts’ “relative insulation 
from the democratic process . . . situate[s] them uniquely well to police malfunctions in that 
process”); THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF 
LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 7 (1992) (arguing that judges should stop abdicating in favor 
of the other branches of government in foreign-affairs cases because they “are much better suited 
than is sometimes alleged to make decisions incidentally affecting foreign relations and national 
security”); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER 
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 181–84 (1990) (noting that “the role of judges is to define the 
rule of law by drawing the line between illegitimate exercises of political power and legitimate 
exercises of legal authority,” in part by moving away from doctrines of abstention in certain types 
of cases). 
314. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 451–52 (questioning “Madisonian assumptions 
about congressional capacity and motivation” and arguing that “courts should be more 
circumspect about invoking congressional acquiescence as a basis for deferring to executive 
practice”). 
315. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1743, 1752 (2013) (“[A]rguments for ‘Madisonian’ judging go wrong by assuming that 
judges stand outside the Madisonian system.”); cf. Jide Nzelibe, Our Partisan Foreign Affairs 
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Moreover, for a variety of reasons, courts often give weight to established 
patterns of governmental practice.316  If so, they might actually reduce 
Congress’s ability to resist assertions of presidential authority rather than 
enhance it, by instantiating Executive practice into judicial doctrine. 
In any event, it is worth noting that the shift to a new understanding of 
presidential authority on treaty termination cannot be attributed simply to 
Executive aggrandizement.  It is striking how actively involved Congress 
and the Senate were in these issues in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, even in instances in which presidents sought to act unilaterally.  
That sort of congressional focus on treaty termination dissipated, however, 
by the 1930s.  Although the issue would resurface in select instances of 
policy debate, most notably in the debate over the termination of the 
Taiwan Treaty, Congress and the Senate no longer sought to protect 
institutional prerogatives relating to treaty termination in any systematic 
way.  Moreover, Congress and the Senate seem largely to have given up on 
the issue since the Taiwan debate, mounting only token resistance at the 
time of the termination of the ABM Treaty and no resistance at all to 
dozens of other presidential terminations. 
Whether normatively attractive or not, the influence of historical 
practice on the separation of powers is likely to vary depending on the 
issue.  Treaty termination is an especially good candidate for it, given the 
lack of any specific constitutional text relating to the issue.317  The overlay 
 
Constitution, 97 MINN. L. REV. 838, 899–900 (2013) (“Even though judges and academic 
commentators may not necessarily be susceptible to the same instrumental motivations as elected 
officials, they may very well be plagued by both the kinds of cognitive biases and motivated 
reasoning that largely track partisan judgments in the electoral arena.”). 
316. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 418–22 (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
recognition of “the significance of . . . practice-based ‘gloss’” when textual or other forms of 
guidance are absent or ambiguous). 
317. When there is constitutional text that is perceived to be clear, it is likely to serve as a 
focal point for the practice of government actors.  See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and 
Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 708 (2011) 
(noting that “it is an indisputable feature of constitutional practice that the text is taken to be 
authoritative within its domain”); John O. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in 
Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers, 
56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 293, 300–01 (1993) (“Relatively clear [constitutional] provisions in 
the separation of powers area may be enforced because they are natural focal points of bargains.”); 
Strauss, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 307, at 911 (describing “conventionalism” as “a 
way of avoiding costly and risky disputes and of expressing respect for fellow citizens” through 
“allegiance to the text of the Constitution”).  Relatedly, clear text may have a tendency to “crowd 
out” norms based on practice.  See Michael C. Dorf, How the Written Constitution Crowds Out the 
Extraconstitutional Rule of Recognition, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION, supra note 284, at 69, 
76.  That said, whether text is perceived as being clear might itself be affected by practice.  See 
Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 431; see also Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, 
Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional Text (Feb. 19, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author) (developing this point).  The perception of textual clarity might also be affected 
by what is at stake, see Levinson, supra, at 709–10 (asserting that the Constitution is perceived as 
being clear on many low-stakes issues but unclear on many high-stakes ones), and by one’s 
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of a mix of international-law rules governing treaty termination, as well as 
potential distinctions between suspension and termination and between 
partial and complete termination, have also made presidential unilateralism 
relating to the issue a more complicated target to assess and criticize.  In 
addition, judicial review has been especially limited for this issue, which 
means that the political branches have had to work the issue out themselves, 
without even much of a shadow of judicial supervision.  On issues for 
which there is more textual guidance, a less complicated legal landscape, or 
a greater likelihood of judicial intervention, practice is likely to play a lesser 
role.  Certainly decisions like INS v. Chadha318 confirm that the Supreme 
Court will not inevitably give effect to even longstanding political-branch 
practice.319 
C. Is It Law? 
Another challenge to the practice-based approach to constitutional 
authority described in this Article would be to dismiss it as merely an 
account of politics rather than law.  The argument would be that, without 
any dispositive judicial resolution, the practice will simply be the result of 
the push and pull of the political process.  The constitutional “law” of treaty 
termination, on this account, would merely be a pattern of behavior without 
normative significance.320  If so, it might not be entitled to any particular 
weight in debates about constitutional interpretation. 
As an initial matter, it is not clear why judicial review is so central to 
this purported distinction between politics and law.  Presidential 
compliance with judicial decisions is itself a practice-based norm of U.S. 
constitutional law.  It is largely taken for granted today, but this has not 
always been the case.  As Daryl Levinson has noted, “[c]asting courts as 
constitutional enforcers merely pushes the question back to why powerful 
political actors are willing to pay attention to what judges say; why ‘people 
with money and guns ever submit to people armed only with gavels.’”321 
 
constitutional methodology, see Alison L. LaCroix, Historical Gloss: A Primer, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 75, 81 (2013) (“Whether a text is ambiguous is itself determined by one’s chosen 
interpretive method.”). 
318. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
319. Id. at 944–45, 959 (holding that a “legislative veto” provision enacted by Congress was 
unconstitutional even though Congress had enacted hundreds of legislative veto provisions since 
the 1930s). 
320. Cf. Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional 
Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1836 (2009) (“We might also understand the 
settlement of non-textual constitutional issues as instances of successful coordination.”); Posner & 
Vermeule, supra note 301, at 1002 (“Precedents may just be patterns of behavior that parties 
recognize as providing focal points that permit cooperation or coordination.”). 
321. Levinson, supra note 317, at 661 (quoting Matthew C. Stephenson, “When the Devil 
Turns . . .”: The Political Foundations of Independent Judicial Review, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 59, 60 
(2003)). 
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To be sure, there is a strand of British (and, more generally, 
Commonwealth) constitutional thinking that would limit the term 
“constitutional law” to norms that are enforceable by the judiciary.  Under 
this view, associated most notably with the writings of A.V. Dicey, norms 
of constitutional practice that are not judicially enforceable are termed 
instead “constitutional conventions.”322  This distinction, however, does not 
map well onto U.S. constitutional understandings.  For example, there are a 
variety of nonjusticiability doctrines in U.S. law, such as the political 
question doctrine, that hypothesize that there can be constitutional law that 
might not be judicially enforceable.323  In addition, there has been a 
significant emphasis in U.S. scholarship in recent years on the importance 
of “constitutional law outside the courts,”324 an approach that implicitly 
declines to equate constitutional law simply with what is enforced by the 
judiciary.  The longstanding idea of “underenforced constitutional norms” 
similarly is based on the idea that constitutional law is broader than what is 
judicially enforceable.325 
In any event, the likelihood of judicial review for the issue of treaty 
termination is not zero, and in fact the lower federal courts did address the 
issue in the controversy over the termination of the Taiwan Treaty.326  Thus, 
even if a shadow of possible judicial review were needed in order for a 
norm to have a legal character, such a shadow does exist for this issue, 
although it may be faint.  Moreover, we know that courts often take account 
of longstanding practices when interpreting the separation of powers.327 
 
322. See A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 
361, 366 (6th ed. 1902) (“‘[C]onventions of the constitution’ . . . [are] customs, practices, maxims, 
or precepts which are not enforced or recognised by the Courts” and “cannot be enforced by any 
Court of law [and so] have no claim to be considered laws”); see also Adrian Vermeule, 
Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1182 (2013) (noting this point). 
323. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 292 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“The issue 
[before the Court] is not whether severe partisan gerrymanders violate the Constitution, but 
whether it is for the courts to say when a violation has occurred, and to design a remedy.”). 
324. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES (2004); MARK TUSHNET, 
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). 
325. See, e.g., Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced 
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1221 (1978) (stating that “constitutional norms 
which are underenforced by the federal judiciary should be understood to be legally valid to their 
full conceptual limits, and federal judicial decisions which stop short of these limits should be 
understood as delineating only the boundaries of the federal courts’ role in enforcing the norm” 
rather than the boundaries of the norms themselves); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially 
Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1299 (2006) 
(crediting Sager’s argument that “it would be a mistake to equate judicial enforcement, and thus 
the tests applied by courts, with the meaning of constitutional guarantees”). 
326. The Supreme Court has also recently signaled a narrow view of the political question 
doctrine, even in the area of foreign affairs.  Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427 (2012) 
(describing the political question doctrine as a “narrow exception” to the judiciary’s obligation to 
decide cases). 
327. See supra notes 53–62 and accompanying text. 
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Another potential answer to the “it’s all politics” critique is the simple 
observation that participants in the legal system generally view the issue of 
treaty termination as governed by legal norms.  As noted earlier, at least 
according to legal philosophers working in the tradition of H.L.A. Hart, 
whether something is “law” depends on social facts—that is, it depends on 
whether the relevant community treats it as law.328  Under that conception, 
it is significant that Congress, the Executive Branch, and legal scholars 
have long treated the issue of treaty termination as one of constitutional law 
and that they have viewed historical practice as relevant to determining the 
content of this law.  The issue of treaty termination can therefore be 
distinguished from other customary conventions of U.S. constitutional 
practice that are not viewed as legal in character, such as (to take one 
example) the convention of senatorial courtesy for judicial appointments.329 
To say that the issue of treaty termination is one of constitutional law 
does not mean that the law on this issue is fully settled.  It is conceivable 
that the Senate or Congress at some point could assert itself on this issue, 
especially in a situation in which there was significant policy disagreement 
with the President’s decision to terminate a particular treaty.  It is even 
conceivable that the Senate or Congress could successfully force a President 
to back down, or at least to seek formal legislative approval for a 
termination.  But the description of the constitutional law set forth above in 
subpart (IV)(A) is probably both the best prediction of likely future practice 
and also the best prediction of the position of the courts if they were at 
some point to intervene in this area.  In any event, many issues of 
constitutional law are not entirely settled even after being resolved by the 
Supreme Court, especially if the Court is closely divided, and this fact is not 
viewed by itself as making constitutional law merely epiphenomenal. 
Notwithstanding these points, the dynamic between Congress and the 
Executive Branch with respect to treaty termination is obviously 
intertwined with political, and not just legal, considerations.  Political 
realities, such as the President’s first-mover advantage over Congress and 
the tendency of members of Congress to support the President if he is of the 
same party, are likely to play a role in how the legal norms governing this 
issue develop.  It is no coincidence that the most significant controversy 
over presidential termination of treaties occurred in connection with the 
Taiwan Treaty and associated recognition of mainland China, surrounding 
 
328. See supra note 284 and accompanying text. 
329. Scholarship on U.S. constitutional conventions has tended to mix together legal and 
nonlegal practices.  See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 333–
87 (2012); HERBERT W. HORWILL, THE USAGES OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 23–43 
(1925).  For a useful effort to distinguish between conventions based on whether they impose 
“thin” or “thick” obligations, see Vermeule, supra note 322, at 1186–91.  See also Dorf, supra 
note 317, at 89 (distinguishing between entrenched practices and constitutionally normative 
practices). 
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which there was substantial policy disagreement.  Legally normative 
conventions in this context are therefore affected, perhaps heavily, by 
politics.330  But this does not mean that these conventions entirely collapse 
into politics.331  Moreover, this blending of law and politics almost certainly 
describes constitutional law in other contexts as well.332 
There are also likely still some legal constraints on presidential action 
in this area.  It can reasonably be predicted, for example, that if the Senate 
conditioned its advice and consent to a treaty on senatorial approval of any 
termination, and a president later attempted to ignore that condition, there 
would be significant resistance, even by senators of the President’s own 
party.333  Moreover, this resistance would likely be framed and debated in 
legal terms.  It is also likely that, when deciding whether to take such 
action, the President would be advised by lawyers who would consider past 
governmental practice in assessing the state of the law.  None of this is to 
suggest that these considerations would be dispositive in presidential 
decision making, just that they would likely be a factor. 
Despite these points, a focus on the role of historical practice in 
discerning the separation of powers almost inevitably mixes together 
internal and external perspectives on the law.334  As noted, invocations of 
such practice have long been part of the internal legal argumentation in 
debates over treaty termination.  At the same time, there are a variety of 
 
330. In answer to a question, noted above, that was posed by Bruce Ackerman after President 
Bush announced that he was terminating the ABM Treaty, see supra note 248 and accompanying 
text, politics (both domestic and international) would likely operate as a significant constraint on 
unilateral presidential termination of something like the NATO pact or the UN Charter. 
331. See 1 HOWARD GILLMAN, MARK A. GRABER & KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT 5 (2013) (“Rather than obsess about 
whether constitutionalism is pure law or pure politics, we should study the distinctive ways 
American constitutionalism blends legal and political considerations.”).  See generally Curtis A. 
Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Essay, Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal 
Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097 (2013) (explaining why a connection between practice-
based understandings of constitutional authority and political considerations does not make the 
understandings nonlegal). 
332. For example, efforts to reconcile the political and legal aspects of the Supreme Court’s 
exercise of constitutional judicial review are longstanding and include perhaps most famously 
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR 
OF POLITICS (1962).  See also Frank B. Cross, The Ideology of Supreme Court Opinions and 
Citations, 97 IOWA L. REV. 693, 695 (2012) (“Scholars today widely recognize that Supreme 
Court opinions are not purely legal but, to some degree, reflect the ideology of the Justices.”). 
333. An analogous issue concerns executive agreements: Despite the general rise of 
congressional–executive agreements in lieu of Article II treaties, the Senate has made clear at 
various times that it believes that significant arms-control agreements must be concluded as 
Article II treaties, and there has been successful bipartisan resistance in the Senate—framed in 
legal terms—to presidential efforts to do otherwise.  See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 
473–75 (describing this resistance). 
334. See HART, supra note 284, at 89 (distinguishing between the “external” perspective of 
someone who is merely an observer of the rules of a social group and the “internal” perspective of 
someone who is a member of the group and “accepts and uses [the rules] as guides to conduct”). 
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reasons to think that such practice also has an external effect on the 
development of the law relating to this issue, whether such law is 
interpreted by the courts or by nonjudicial actors.  There is tension between 
these two accounts since the more that the account is external, the more that 
the law will seem epiphenomenal.  It is at least plausible to think, however, 
that the internal and external accounts are interrelated, such that historical 
practice not only affects legal understandings but is also itself affected by 
such understandings. 
Conclusion 
Termination of treaties by the United States provides an important 
illustration of how historical practice can inform and even define the 
separation of powers.  The constitutional text does not specifically address 
the issue, so practice has by necessity long played a central role in the legal 
analysis.  Particularly in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—and 
then again in the controversy in the 1970s over the termination of the 
Taiwan Treaty—debates in Congress repeatedly focused on practice as 
relevant evidence of constitutional meaning.  Legal advisers in the 
Executive Branch have also long emphasized the importance of practice in 
assessing the Constitution’s distribution of authority over this issue.  In 
addition to showing how practices can inform constitutional interpretation, 
the issue of treaty termination enriches our understanding of constitutional 
change.  The twentieth-century shift towards a unilateral presidential power 
of termination was not the result of one particular controversy or period of 
deliberation, and it was not primarily driven by judicial decisions.  Instead, 
the shift involved a gradual accretion of actions and claims by the Executive 
Branch combined with long periods of inaction by Congress.  This account 
sheds light on some of the interpretive and normative challenges associated 
with a practice-based approach to the separation of powers. 
 
